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On the morning of December 17
th
 2010, a Tunisian fruit vendor named Mohamed 
Bouazizi took a can of gasoline and lit himself on fire in front of the local governor’s 
office in protest of having his cart and its inventory confiscated by a corrupt police force. 
What began as act of individual protest against the Tunisian state evolved into mass 
demonstrations across the Arab world significantly altering the political landscape.  
While researchers have explored links between economic determinants and the outbreak 
of civil conflict, use of large datasets and econometric analysis alone has been unable to 
draw the indelible connections scholars had hoped. The use of country wide data are seen 
as insufficient in capturing localized dynamics of civil violence calling into question the 
applicability of current conceptual frameworks. Case study and data collection at 
sufficient granularity are now necessary steps in the further exploration of this topic. To 
help develop our understanding of how localized conflict emerges this dissertation steps 
away from the use of traditional case study and econometric analysis to develop two 
 
 
agent based models of protest that allow exploration to changes in the average level of 
utility, its distribution, and growth on the onset, size, and frequency of protest.   
This dissertation finds that the level and distribution of utility affects the onset, evolution, 
magnitude, and frequency of civil instability. Further, empirical methods explored to date 
fail to account for significant micro dynamic behavior that influences the emergence of 
mass protest. This dissertation extends earlier modeling work on civil protest and 
discusses findings on how utility levels in a system of agents affect the magnitude, 
frequency, onset, and structure of civil conflict. The most surprising finding is the 
bifurcated relationship between utility distribution and the emergence of civil conflict. 
This specific result provides a plausible explanation for why empirical analysis has thus 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“All civilization from time to time has become a  
thin crust over the volcano of revolution” 
-Havelock Ellis 
 
On the morning of December 17
th
 2010, a Tunisian fruit vendor named Mohamed 
Bouazizi took a can of gasoline and doused himself in front of the local governor’s office. 
Yelling in the middle of a busy street “How do you expect me to make a living?”, he 
struck a match and lit himself on fire.  The sole income earner for his family, Bouazizi 
was upset at having his fruit cart confiscated by local police who frequently harassed 
vendors in the area. The morning prior, Bouazizi had borrowed money to purchase his 
inventory only to have his cart and inventory confiscated by the state. With no other 
means to support his household and now deeply in debt, Bouazizi sought an audience 
with the local governor who refused to meet with him. With seemingly no other means of 
voicing his discontent,  Bouazizi embraced an extreme form of protest against his 
economic condition. The self-immolation and subsequent death of Bouazizi sparked 
immediate protest in the localities outside of Tunis, quickly increasing in scale and 
intensity eventually leading to the removal of the central authority. What began as an 
individual protest of ’s economic condition against an agent of the Tunisian state, spread 
across the Arab world leading to civil protest, revolt, and in Libya and Syria -- civil war. 
What has become known as the Arab Spring has dramatically transformed the domestic 
politics of states in the region and has altered the geo-political calculations of the 




Armed violence in its various shapes and forms has lead to the deaths of over 740,000 
people per year.
1
 While civil conflict is not a new phenomenon, the correlation between 
failed states and rising fatalities resulting from internal conflict has made it an enduring 
international security challenge. The problem of civil conflict includes its moral 
considerations, possible spillover effects, the use of denied areas as a base for terrorism, 
and the economic consequences associated with the possible impediment of trade in the 
region. From piracy in Somalia, insurgency in Mali, or the massive loss of human life in 
Congo serves to highlight the ongoing importance of this issue for international security 
practitioners and scholars.    
 
Scholarship on Economic Determinants of Civil Conflict is Insufficient 
 
Central to developing policies that help stem the slide into conflict are efforts to 
understand the conditions associated with intrastate strife. Research efforts have explored 
environmental, political, and economic determinants using both qualitative case studies 
and large macro-economic regression analysis. Current theory on how economic 
conditions in a country affect the emergence of civil conflict explains its presence as a 
function of the difference between the benefits accrued to participants after its they 
account for the costs of rebellion. The so-called supply side eschews individualized 
grievance arguments and states that when the sum of estimated benefits outweighs the 
                                                     
1
 Global Burden of Armed Violence, Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Geneva 2008, 
http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Global-Burden-of-Armed-Violence-full-report.pdf   
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perceived costs, conflict ensues.  Therefore, conflict is merely a quasi-criminal enterprise 
with its true purpose cloaked in the language of a more noble cause (e.g inequality or 
poverty).  
The supply side explanation suffers from two primary weaknesses. First, it assumes that 
the populace who either directly or indirectly support insurrection calculate the benefits 
and costs of rebellion with the same value, weightings, and probability of success at the 
same time. By doing so this construct assumes homogeneity among individuals and does 
not account for non-financial costs (i.e possibility of death, separation from family, etc)  
in the calculation. This simplifies the decision to a point where an extra dollar of income 
from rebellion is enough to have them quit their profession and join a rebellion.  In 
addition to failing to account for non-financial costs, this construct must assume that all 
persons seeking to rebel calculate the benefits and costs in a similar manner and at a close 
enough interval to engage in mass action. Even if we set aside the timing problem, the 
construct that financial gain from lootable resources are the only gains one person would 
want from protest and revolt ignores very real motives human beings have had for 
engaging in protest. 
The second problem with the current theoretical construct is that it does not account for 
localized dynamics. If the decision calculus is applied across the country to each citizen, 
there is no means by which ’s decision is influenced by their neighbors. This provides us 
with an image that a individual finding that the benefits outweigh costs to protest runs 
into the street only to find that that no one else is ready to join. This creates a problem in 
understanding how protests originate, form, develop, and grow into larger movements.   
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Towards Understanding the Dynamics of Localized Civil Conflict 
 
Civil conflicts are episodic in nature often stemming from localized conditions for which 
large country level data analysis is poorly suited to understand the evolving dynamics of 
protest and revolt. The lack of consensus on the applicability of some econometric results 
has lead to calls for additional data collection at sufficient granularity to capture localized 
conditions prior to and during outbreaks of civil conflict. Obtaining higher granularity 
data sets not only requires financial resources, but also are frequently undertaken in 
difficult conditions and often in areas that threaten the safety of the researchers 
themselves. Because of the inherent cost and difficulty of gathering data, the first step in 
developing higher resolution analysis must be conceptual exploration of localized 
conditions to help identify the most useful observations for subsequent analysis. This 
dissertation is an attempt to meet that challenge by conceptually exploring micro level 
dynamics of civil conflict, specifically how economic condition of the individual 
influences the evolution localized protest and revolt. This has the benefit of not only 
allowing for a better theoretical understanding of what is transpiring at the local level, but 
serves a practical purpose in defining what data would be useful in understanding the 
relationship between economic conditions and the emergence of civil conflict. In this 
regard, agent based models are uniquely suited to explore bottom up approaches and to 
identify localized dynamics that more traditional methods are unable to capture.  
In this spirit this dissertation steps away from traditional case studies and econometric 
analysis to develop an agent based model of protest that allows us to conceptually explore 
how changes to the average level of utility, its distribution, and growth affect the onset, 
size, and frequency of protest. The approach taken allows us to make changes to 
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individual economic conditions and then observe the evolution of protest.  I find that 
lower levels of utility increase the size, frequency, and onset of civil protest. I also find 
that the distribution of utility between individuals significantly impacts the magnitude 
and the frequency of punctuated protest. Most significantly I find that inequality is shown 
to have a more complicated relationship with civil protest than previously thought. In 
higher utility models, inequality has a direct relationship with civil protest, while in lower 
utility systems it reverses to help engineer greater civil protest. This result highlights a 
significant problem in most empirical models seeking to test for statistical correlation 
between inequality and civil conflict. Specifically this result demonstrates that most 
models that have sought to test the relationship between the two are mis-specified. Policy 
conclusions generated from the belief that inequality does not matter in the generation of 
civil protest need to be reassessed.  
The Structure of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation is structured in a linear fashion: a review of the scholarly literature, a 
discussion the methodology employed in the study, the results of the static and dynamic 
models, and finally a discussion of the policy considerations and areas for future 
research. The literature review found in the second chapter of this dissertation broadly 
reviews determinants of civil conflict. This chapter also addresses conceptual changes on 
how we think about the emergence of civil protest and violence in society. This view is 
derived from earlier work utilizing agent based models, notably the Brooking 
Institution’s Brookings Model.  
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The third chapter details the specific methodology and computer code developed for the 
purposes of conducting research. This chapter utilizes a framework that attempts to make 
the structure and assumptions in the model transparent to the reader who might not be 
familiar with agent based models. The full code utilized in this dissertation can be found 
in the appendix.   
The fourth and fifth chapters of the dissertation lay out the results of a static and 
intertemporal model. The central findings build upon earlier work of Epstein, 
Steinbruner, and Parker who introduced the original Brookings Model. The findings stem 
from a more thorough exploration of conceptual changes to that model by highlighting 
how changes to average utility and its distribution affect the onset, frequency, and 
duration of protest.  The fifth chapter moves beyond simple changes to average utility 
and distribution and introduces changes to utility over time. This effort is a broader 
extension of earlier research efforts by demonstrating how both changes to the average 
level of utility affect protest, but also how the rate of change to utility directly affect the 
magnitude, duration, frequency, and evolution of civilian protest into open revolt. 
The final chapter of this dissertation discusses policy implications of the model’s findings 
along with suggestions for future areas of research. The policy implications discussed 
primarily address the surprising results dealing with changes to utility and specifically 
how inequality of utility affects civil unrest. Areas of future research are divided between 
suggestions for improvement of the conceptual model and for areas of future empirical 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity. 
 
-William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming 
 
Modern scholarship on the origins and determinants of civil violence is multi faceted 
covering ecological, social, geographical, and economic variables that lead to social 
instability. In this chapter, I limit my discussion of social instability to the literature 
concerned with economic determinants of social instability discussing in broad terms the 
central finding of key researchers, the evolution of their ideas, and finally the current 
state of the field. Lastly, I advance my position that individual economic condition is a 
central motivator for men to engage in unorganized civil protest and is best understood as 
a resulting phenomenon emerging from interactions between individual agents who 
choose to either express their grievance or to remain quiet based on the legitimacy of the 
central authority or the presence of security forces. The argument draws from both 
grievance and rational actor literature and is centered on the individual as the primary 
unit of analysis. The resulting conclusion supports the use of agent based modeling as a 
useful and necessary tool for understanding the complexity and underlying dynamics of 
civil protest and violence. The use of agent based modeling allows us to overcome the 
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collective action problem that has been put forth by rational actor proponents as a 
fundamental weakness of grievance based determinants of civil violence. The use of this 
construct allows us to move beyond statistical analysis that attempts to connect variables 
through correlation and towards a system that provides a coherent and evolutionary 
model that ties individual economic condition to mass protest.  
 
Individual Grievance as Motivation: Relative Deprivation 
 
Political scientists extended the observations of Plato, Aristotle, and De Tocqueville for 
social instability more formally in the 20
th
 century. The early theory for determinants of 
civil conflict and rebellion are tied to measures of individual or group grievance. 
Individual grievance, or what Ted Gurr termed relative deprivation, explores the 
psychological underpinnings of human frustration leading to aggression tying in societal 
condition and the mobilization problem of mass protest and rebellion. While the 
grievance literature encompasses a wide range of determinants leading to individual 
frustration, this dissertation specifically limits our definition of relative deprivation to 
economic factors.  
 Group grievance, specifically frustration resulting from inequality, primarily discusses 
the role of land or income inequality and aggression between groups. Both views 
independent of individual or group grievance discuss the mobilization challenge of 
turning angst of individuals into mass protest. The mobilization problem for would be 
protestors therefore becomes an important determinant of organized protest, rebellion, 
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and possibly civil war leading future researchers to focus less on motivation and more on 
the feasibility of rebellion.   
While conflict between rulers and the ruled have remained a constant throughout human 
history, speculative conclusions between the human condition and the manifestation of 
civil violence constituted the bulk of human knowledge on the subject until the mid 20
th
 
century. The modern treatment of the subject focused on two competing views of the 
determinants of human aggression: individual vice group grievance. While group 
grievance maintains elements of arguments associated with individual frustration, its 
primary focus is centered upon conflicts between groups/classes stemming primarily 
from inequality.  
The modern treatment for understanding the reasons for individuals to rebel against the 
state stems from the work of Davies 1968 and Gurr 1970. Gurr examines the 
psychological and social sources of potential conflict, the potential for the political 
institutions to be blamed as the source of the individual’s frustration, and finally what 
societal conditions magnify and form the rebellion (Gurr 1970).   Developing what 
becomes known as the “Frustration-Aggression” proposition, Gurr asserts that the greater 
the intensity of the frustration among individuals in a society the greater the magnitude of 
violence witnessed. The frustration manifests itself into violence that affects the scope, 
intensity, and duration of action among the populace.  Gurr outlines the manifestation of 
violent action as the movement from discontent of the populace, to politicization of that 
discontent, to finally actualization of the frustration towards aggression against the state.  
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Gurr formally defines the frustration of individuals as the difference between a person’s 
value expectation and their value capabilities. The difference is identified as relative 
deprivation. The individual’s value expectations include their desires to obtain for 
themselves and their family the physical (e.g shelter, food), political (e.g democratic 
rights, or expression), and psychological goods (e.g prestige) required to lead a fulfilling 
life. Their value capabilities are their perceived ability to achieve these goods at present 
and into the future.  Therefore, Gurr argues that changes to the intensity of a person’s 
deprivation and the scope of that condition across society motivate individuals to rebel.  
The purpose of our exploration is to understand how purely economic conditions affect 
the actions of an individual to engage in protest against the state. While grievance 
arguments are multifaceted, I am specifically interested in how changes to income or 
state subsidies affect a person’s condition. Therefore I use the term relative deprivation to 
specifically mean the difference between an individual’s expected and actual economic 
condition. The intensity of the relative deprivation is primarily a measure of change to the 
individual’s specific life condition. This condition can be thought to be primarily tied to 
income, but a broader measure of individual utility which includes the affect of state 
services, inflation, or economic growth are likely to capture the broader individual 
condition. Utilizing the cruder income measure an individual who earns 100,000 dollars 
in one year, but loses his job the next, finds his capability of achieving his value 
expectations is significantly reduced thereby intensifying the relative deprivation. The 
intensity of loss can be mitigated through diversified support structures such as savings, 
family, or the state. However, in extreme circumstances with little to no support, 
individuals might resort to dramatic action to stem the intensity felt.   When Tunisian 
11 
 
fruit vendor Mohamad Bouazizi had his vegetable cart confiscated in December 2010, his 
sole means of supporting a family of eight, the intensity of the loss spurred him to set 
himself ablaze in front of the regional police station as a protest
2
. Bouazizi’s action was 
unlikely part of a highly thought out public relations campaign to engineer a rebellion 
against the Tunisian government, but more likely an expression of extreme frustration 
about the conditions he was experiencing.  
The intensity of relative deprivation is important in understanding how a person’s 
frustration about his or her situation translates to possible protest, however, the specific 
circumstances of individuals cannot alone explain mass protest or rebellion. Instead, 
given that mass protest or revolt is a group activity, the intensity of the deprivation must 
be shared amongst others for mobilization to extend beyond a single act of frustration. 
Gurr defines this as the scope of the deprivation, with the appropriate question being 
what proportion of the society is discontented beyond a specific threshold (Gurr 1970). 
Scope therefore is a horizontal measure of relative deprivation across more than one 
individual. The protests that emerged in Tunisia after Bouazizi set himself on fire began 
first as a voice of support, but soon morphed into larger protests centered on economic 
conditions (e.g unemployment) and the government’s incompetence in dealing with those 
conditions
3
. The intensity of the deprivation first demonstrated by Bouazizi through his 
individual act of protest triggered other individuals to act in ways that revealed the scope 
of deprivation amongst the Tunisian populace, becoming the rallying call for organized 
protest against the state. So if the scope of relative deprivation is also important how do 
we measure it in a society? Instinctively we might want to understand the distribution of 







income as a proxy, but Gurr’s point about scope is not purely distributive. Gurr cites that 
relative deprivation between groups, or horizontal inequity, drives an individual 
perception of their condition (Gurr 1993, 2000). It is possible to have a situation where a 
group of individuals are doing relatively well based on a national average, but compared 
to another group are lacking. This horizontal inequity can generate frustration as their 
inability to reach their expectations as compared to another group remains a source of 
relative deprivation. Therefore, the scope of deprivation implies that distribution within 
context matters. The combination of income, distribution, group dynamics, and 
percentage of populace living below some threshold determines the scope of deprivation 
not simply the distribution. This implies that a measure of inequality alone is insufficient 
as a determinant for civil protest or rebellion.  
In Gurr’s argument, the central unit of analysis is the individual. His theory is grounded 
in the psychological desires for individuals to meet their expectations. Specific to this 
analysis is the desire to primarily provide the physical goods for oneself and family (e.g 
shelter and food) followed by political expression and finally by psychological goods (e.g 
honor or prestige). The intensity and scope of deprivation become instrumental as a 
motivation for unorganized protest or rebellion.   
 
Group Grievance as Motivation: Inequality   
 
 While individual hardship and the grievance that may result from it is a logical extension 
from psychological studies that draw the connection between frustration and aggression 
other researchers contend that while possibly true, it is the inherent group inequality that 
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that drives mobilization for protest and rebellion. This is the distinction that moves us 
from a single man lashing out in a crime or act of protest and towards a larger group that 
engages in peaceful protest or riot over their perceived hardship. The inequality 
proposition is divided into two competing views. First, that inequality, specifically in 
regards to land, is the primary determinant of protest. More specifically, “the land 
maldistribution hypothesis is based on the assumption that discontent resulting from a 
highly concentrated distribution of land and/or lack of land ownership (landlessness) in 
agrarian societies is an important direct cause of mass political violence” (Muller & 
Seligson 1987). Russett is typical of this view in stating that  
“extreme inequality of land distribution leads to political instability only in those 
poor, predominantly agricultural societies where limitation to a small plot of land 
almost unavoidably condemns one to poverty” (Russett 1964)  
Russett finds in his research that inequality of land ownership does correlate with higher 
levels of political violence (Russett 1964). Yet despite this result, one of the problems 
proponents of this view have to contend with is the general lack of quality data on 
measures of inequality. Empirical evidence is generally drawn from case studies or 
limited cross-national datasets. Midlarsky addresses this issue by examining structured  
measures of inequality and finds a bifricated result between inequality and violence 
(Midlarsky 1982, 1988). He argues that simple generalizations of inequality, such as a 
Gini coefficient, are insufficient to capture the relationship between land distribution and 
political violence.  
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The second view of inequality and political violence contends that income inequality, and 
not mal-distribution of land, is the primary determinant of mobilized protest. Edward 
Muller and Mitchell Seligson are typical of this view asserting that income inequality of 
income serves to motivate urban dwellers vice rural peasants (Muller & Seigson 1987).  
They argue that the problem with the land inequality hypothesis is that the organizers 
suffer from a mobilization problem, where in urban settings individuals find it easier to 
find a larger group of disaffected individuals and find it easier to organize. Supports of 
this view tend to argue that the large concentrations of disaffected are both aggrieved and 
are in proximity to one another allowing for better organization, thus making income 
inequality a better measure of the probability of violent action.    
Mobilizing Discontent: Beyond Motivation 
 
To this point we have discussed mostly the motivation by which individuals might justify 
their action against the state. Early theory focused on the individual or group motivation 
that inspires this action acknowledging that moving from individual or group discontent 
toward action required overcoming the mobilization problem (Tilly 1978, Tarrow 1994). 
The development of what became known as the mobilization theory discounted the 
grievance argument all together citing that individual hardship or organized grievance 
always is present (e.g. there will always be poor people), but what is important is the 
ability to mobilize large numbers of individuals. Specifically supporters of this view 
move the debate on the determinants of civil conflict away from measures of individual 
grievance or perceived inequality and towards the issue of collective action (Lichbach 
1994).  Specifically the collective action problem frames the conundrum of joining a 
protest or revolt where a representative rational actor evaluates the costs versus benefits 
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of the action (Olson 1965). Central to the conundrum is if one can enjoy the benefits of a 
protest without joining, why not free ride on the efforts of others? If this holds true 
grievance alone is not enough to organize mass protest or sustained violence (Lichbach 
1994). The cost-benefit structure assumes a representative agent who evaluates the 
benefits of engaging in a successful rebellion versus the highly significant personal costs 
of failing in the endeavor (e.g death or jail). Of course rebellions have in fact occurred, 
thus challenging the collective action problem and leaving proponents of the mobilization 
problem to deduce the need for private benefits to the would-be rebels (Lichbach 1990, 
1994).  The benefits that are needed by individuals to motivate them to protest have 
become the basis for the analysis put forth by the rational choice and specifically the 
greed hypothesis researchers of the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
Rational Choice: Origins of the Greed Hypothesis 
 
Understanding the origins of civil violence had been for decades the domain of political 
scientists, however economists have taken interest in the subject applying models that 
seek to explain human behavior as a set of outcomes based on decisions grounded in 
preferences and future expectations. The rational choice literature is based on the premise 
that individuals evaluate costs and benefits based on their preferences and the information 
they possess. Eschewing political and cognitive explanations of individual grievance or 
deprivation, the choices made by individuals to rebel are due to the individual’s 
perception, preferences, and most importantly the opportunity to take from others.  
Deducing the benefits of protest and rebellion become the primary area of analysis and 
reason for men to rebel. In this construct rebellion is a phenomenon where the collective 
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action problem is overcome by specific inducements to individuals large enough for them 
overwhelm the consequences to their actions.  The origins of this conflict theory are 
based on the crime model proposed by Becker (Becker 1968), and more formally from 
Lichbach (Lichbach 1990, 1994) and Hirshleifer (Hirshleifer 1994). Hirshleifer defines 
his model formally by describing individuals as presented with a decision space that 
based on their perceptions, preferences, and opportunities for obtaining income from 
others inform their actions either to engage in conflict or to negotiate a settlement. 
Essentially the model dictates a profit calculation for the individual. If the person feels 
that the benefits of a successful revolt outweigh the costs of that action then they will 
choose to rebel. If their calculus implies that the costs outweigh the benefits they will 
seek a negotiation. The space for agreement is formed by the actor’s perceptions for their 
likelihood of success. Therefore, the size of the settlement space between individuals, or 
groups, can change based on specific information or to the change in perception. If a 
individual thinks that the chances for victory are high then that will weight their decision 
more heavily towards action. So based on this model, how do individuals mobilize for 
protest or revolt? This view assumes that all individuals roughly weigh and value the 
benefits and costs in the same manner. The opportunity for collective action therefore is 
what results from rational decision making by the representative individual.  This 
approach has been termed as the “supply-side” of rebellion. By assuming that the 
representative agent broadly applies to all people in the society you are able to overcome 
the collective action problem, but it ignores how a conflict can evolve over time leaving 
us with the impression that individuals will reach the decision to rebel at the same time. 
The rational choice framework is useful in advancing our understanding of conflict as a 
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function of individuals weighing the benefits and cost of rebellion. However, this 
approach suffers from some serious deficiencies as it primarily is utilized to quantify the 
economic benefits of rebellion (e.g rents from lootable resources) while ignoring 
unquantifiable benefits to the individual (e.g democratic representation). Further, it has 
no explanation for an evolutionary processes as the representative agent roughly 
processes all information simultaneously. If in fact we relax this binding constraint the 
individual would need not only calculate all benefits and costs, but also the probabilities 
of others showing up, thereby falling victim to the same collective action problem it cites 
against grievance based arguments.   
The ability to overcome the collective action problem for rebels became a central concept 
of conflict scholarship in the 1990s. Researchers noting the pervasive and intractable 
problem of poverty world-wide attempted to move the debate to one where the 
emergence of civil violence moved beyond reasons that are likely to always persist (e.g 
poverty), and to one where the conditions made it possible for rebellions to sustain itself 
financially, allowing protest to evolve into civil war. While Lichbach and Hirshleifer 
defined the individual logic and conceptual ground for rebellions to occur only where the 
benefits of rebellion outweigh the costs, it wasn’t until Collier & Hoeffler defined a 
construct and attempted broad based testing that these concepts rose to the vanguard of 
conflict scholarship. 
 




Rational choice theory of civil war has profoundly shaped scholarship of civil violence, 
specifically the discussion of causes of civil war over the past 15 years.  The papers, 
books, and case studies generated over have served to mold public policy initiatives 
aimed at reducing the chance of large-scale civil conflict. The work of Grossman and 
Hirshleifer focused the interests of economists who sought explanations that separated 
the romantic idealization of the revolutionary leader fighting for freedom towards the 
conditions that made civil war feasible. Two sets of researchers have moved this area of 
scholarship forward. Collier & Hoeffler and Fearon & Laitin have articulated and 
adopted the feasibility hypothesis as a likely explanation for the onset of civil war 
providing the field with its dominant view of the likely causes of civil conflict.  
Collier & Hoeffler formally defined their model of the likelihood of civil war by 
proposing a utility model of benefits and costs that define the decision of individuals to 
engage in civil war (Collier & Hoeffler 1998). The model defines a decision of a 
representative individual to rebel as essentially a profit calculation where benefits minus 
costs are defined and computed. If the value is strictly non-zero then war will occur. The 
benefits to the individuals are calculated by summing across periods from the end of 
hostilities through infinity the gains accrued which itself is a function of the taxable base 
and the size of the population. The costs to the individual, summed from the onset of 
rebellion to its conclusion, are lost income and the coordination costs between groups to 
sustain a rebellion. The model implicitly assumes that all actors perceive and calculate 
the benefits and costs equally (or at least on average). The Collier & Hoeffler model 
moves the conflict literature away from discussions of personal or political grievance as 
the source of angst and conflict, and towards a model for which aggregated societal 
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decisions about the benefits of rebellion are the determining factor for the emergence of 
civil war. This model implies that all members of society have access to complete 
information in order to make their calculation, and that all members of society will at 
some point reach the cost benefit calculation at the same time. Collier & Hoeffler do not 
provide a framework on how this phenomenon emerges amongst the populace, only 
simply to identify the activity as a binary condition (e.g civil war occurs or does not 
occur).  
The model presented in the initial rational choice argument lays out a theoretical 
framework from which to test specific variables utilizing a logit regression model(Collier 
& Hoeffler 1998). To test the viability of their theory, Collier & Hoeffler specify 
independent variables aimed at capturing correlating effects between them and the 
outbreak of civil war. They test measures of economic activity, political and economic 
grievance, as well as socio-demographic determinants for civil war (Collier & Hoeffler 
1998, 2002). They conclude that high incomes, smaller populations, average social 
fractionalization are the most stable, while countries with low income, higher levels of 
natural resources, and average fractionalization increase the level of conflict.  Mostly 
importantly, they find that measures of grievance (levels of democracy, income 
inequality, and high ethnic fractionalization) have little to no explanatory power for the 
emergence of civil war (Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2002). Yet they do find a strong 
relationship between specific levels of primary commodity resources (e.g 22-31%) 
relative to GDP, and measures of economic output (e.g lower GDP per capita and lower 
economic growth) (Collier & Hoeffler 1998).  
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Collier & Hoeffler interpret their results in the construct of the benefit cost model for the 
onset of civil war (Collier 2000, Collier & Hoeffler 2002). The authors explain the 
significance of primary commodity share of GDP as a readily accessible financing 
measure for rebels due to the immobility of resources by the government. As the level of 
primary commodity as a share of GDP increases the value to a potential rebel group 
increases thereby increasing the benefits accrued to a rebel force. Interestingly, the 
authors note that the result is not monotonic and instead implies a parabolic shape. They 
reason that as the share of that primary commodity increases relative to total GDP, there 
is a greater incentive for the government to protect the resource. While Collier & 
Hoefeller cite this as strong evidence of rebels motivated by the benefits they accrue from 
lootable resources, others find the result to be fragile, log-liner in shape, and mostly 
explained by oil producing countries (Fearon & Laitin 2003, Fearon 2005).  
In addition to the benefits obtained from the acquisition of a natural resource such as 
timber or diamonds, Collier & Hoeffler find that economic measures such as lower GDP 
per capita and low economic growth increase the probability of an onset of civil war. 
They reason that lower GDP per capita, acting as a proxy for a person’s income, lowers 
the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion. Additionally, lower economic growth implies 
fewer jobs thereby also lowering the opportunity cost of joining in a rebellion. Strangely, 
the authors ignore income per capita as a likely source of individual economic grievance 
instead choosing to see these results as a measure of joining an alternative work structure 
(e.g rebellion against the state).  The authors also find that increased ethnic 
fractionalization lowers the probability of an onset of civil war supporting their 
contention that numerous ethnicities increase the costs of maintaining a unified rebellion. 
21 
 
Lastly, they find that large populations apparently correlate with greater probabilities of 
civil war onset.  
The empirical result stemming from Collier & Hoeffler’s model defined a relatively 
narrow view of what generates the onset of civil war. They moved the discussion away 
from an individual grievance model, and instead focused the analytic efforts on the 
opportunity for civil war informed by multiple citizen’s’ calculus of the costs and 
benefits of a rebellion. This became the basis for what is termed the “greed” hypothesis. 
In its extreme version, civil war is simply a quasi-criminal activity, with rebels seeking 
income from looting natural resources while using the language of grievance (e.g 
inequality, political rights) as part of a larger public relations campaign. The 
identification of specific examples such as the conflict in Sierra Leone (e.g diamonds), or 
the FARC in Columbia (e.g cocaine) provided specific case studies that lend credence to 
the belief that civil war is simply a quasi-criminal enterprise. However, the greed 
hypothesis does not appear to be a good model for explaining more recent revolutions in 
the Arab world (e.g Jordan or Syria).  Collier & Hoeffler although acknowledging 
personal grievance as a factor for rebel support, see the “feasibility” of civil war, defined 
as the financial and military feasibility of victory,  as the definitive determinant of civil 
war and not group grievance (Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner 2007).   
An Alternative Explanation in the Rational Choice Framework  
 
Responding to Collier and Hoeffler and putting forth their own view on the onset and 
prevalence of civil war, Fearon and Laitin support the rational choice framework but 
challenge the primary commodity hypothesis (Fearon & Laitin 2003). Fearon and Laitin 
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broadly agree with Collier and Hoefeller’s view that civil war is a manifestation of 
opportunity by rebels rather than a grievance for lack of political rights or economic 
equality. Yet, while supportive of the rational choice framework in principal, they 
challenge two primary findings of the Collier and Hoeffler model: the relationship 
between primary commodities as a share of GDP and the effect of ethnic fractualization. 
They find that the relationship between primary exports and conflict is both a fragile 
result and one mostly explained by countries with large percentage of oil based exports 
(Fearon & Laitin 2003, Fearon 2005). They also note that once they control for income, 
they are unable to replicate Collier & Hoeffler’s findings of a substantial negative 
relationship between ethnic fractualization and the onset of civil conflict (Fearon & Laitin 
2003). Instead, they argue that the lack of governmental strength manifested in weak 
governance is the primary determinant of civil onset. They also find that similar to 
Collier and Hoeffler, traditional measures of political and economic grievance do not 
appear to be significant.        
 
Grievance Arguments in Response to the Rational Choice Hypothesis 
 
The emergence of the rational choice theory and the subsequent articulation of the “greed 
hypothesis” provided a significant challenge to the broadly accepted grievance theories of 
previous decades. The shift away from individual or group grievance determinants and 
towards a feasibility approach to the emergence of civil violence is largely based on the 
large cross-country datasets used by Collier & Hoeffler and Fearon & Laitin who argue 
that the principal determinant of civil war onset is the feasibility of the conflict and not 
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any underlying grievance. The empirical work that formulates the basis of the greed 
hypothesis has provided some solid statistical evidence. It has pushed the field to address 
some significant questions concerning the determinants of civil war onset and prevalence, 
however, despite the claims of its proponents it has yet to refute the contention that 
grievance of individuals remain an important determinant of civil conflict. Supporters of 
rational choice theory, specifically the greed hypothesis, have acknowledged weaknesses 
in the quality of grievance variables, specifically income inequality. The findings in this 
paper show that assuming a simple direct relationship between inequality measures and 
civil conflict are insufficient to capture the complexities of distributional phenomenon in 
a country and its relationship with civil instability. Researchers have also acknowledged 
that their statistical methods may not be sufficient and have proposed additional work on 
the subject (Collier 2000).   While some evidence in the original Collier & Hoeffler 
model are supported by others, the lack of consensus on a purely primary commodity 
explanation for civil violence undermines the universal conclusion that all civil war is a 
function solely of rent seeking behavior.   In fact, other researchers have explicitly stated 
that there remains no consensus on the issue of income inequality and conflict, arguing 
that the data is both incomplete and insufficiently transparent to draw the inference that 
some grievance indicators are unrelated to the onset of civil war (Sambanis 2004).   
In the wake of research that minimizes the importance of grievance indicators, supporters 
of grievance based motivators for civil conflict have more recently explored these 
outstanding questions by conducting additional studies examining the lack of political 
representation, ethnic tension, and chronic income disparities and have found that they 
have been linked to violent action most specifically terrorism (Crenshaw 2007). Gurr, a 
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strong supporter of individual grievance as a motivator for violent action, has identified 
that ethnic tensions account for significant numbers of conflicts that can not be explained 
by resource based arguments (Gurr 2000). Sambanis finds that as you separate ethnic and 
not ethnic wars, there appears to be a positive relationship between the level of ethnic 
heterogeneity and civil violence (Sambanis 2001). Others have noted that economic 
grievance indicators and not primary commodities are shown to help in the intensity of 
civil wars with grievance factors leading to pent up explosions of frustrations among a 
populace (Lu & Thies 2011). While others show that drops in foreign aid to countries 
leads to civil conflict (Nielsen, R & et al 2011)).  
So where do we stand in our understanding of the determinants of civil conflict? What is 
apparent is that while a great deal of statistical work has been done  on economic, 
political, and socio-demographic condition and the probability of civil conflict, there 
remains significant disagreement on how unorganized protest manifests itself into violent 
collective action. Grievance based arguments of relative deprivation or group inequality 
suffer from the dilemma of collective action, while purely greed based arguments fail to 
incorporate individual or groups grievance as motivation, instead focusing only on rent 
seeking behavior of individuals. While some empirical evidence supports the economic 
greed arguments, the lack of quality event data at local levels for grievance estimators 
calls into question the broader conclusion that individual grievance remains uncorrelated 
with civil violence.      




In the roughly 15 years since the rational choice economic models were proposed, several 
articles have been published examining the statistical relationship of greed and grievance 
indicators on social instability. While several earlier papers have confirmed the 
correlation between economic determinants with civil conflict, later work has called into 
question the broad applicability of those results to all forms of civil violence (Collier 
2000, Collier 2007, Fearon 2005, Epstein 2010, Goldstone et al 2010). Goldstone, Gurr, 
and others have directly refuted the results claiming that changes to model specifications 
show that other measures including political institutional structure matter more than 
economic conditions (Goldstone, Gurr, et al 2010). While a robust debate has continued, 
a consensus has emerged where additional exploration of local conditions is required to 
understand the complex phenomenon occurring in conflict prone areas. A noteworthy 
voice of this consensus is Nicholas Sambanis. In response to the results presented by 
proponents of greed-based determinants, Sambanis argues that comparative case studies 
are required to refine our understanding of the statistical results (Sambanis 2004). He 
argues that a general weaknesses in the economic models of civil war are that they cannot 
distinguish civil war from other forms of political violence and have been shown to suffer 
from problems with measurement error, unit heterogeneity, model misspecification, and 
lack of clarity about causal mechanisms. The inability for these models to understand the 
formation of varying degrees of civil conflict from local conditions seriously undercuts 
our ability to understand political violence (Samabanis 2004).  
In response to a call for localized analysis to help refine our understanding of 
determinants of civil conflict, some case studies and statistical analysis of specific 
localities have begun to be pursued. Three such articles detailing conditions in Nepal, 
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Nigeria, and India highlight the local level data required to understand the local 
conditions that foster social instability (Deraniyagala S (2005), Oyefusi, A (2008), 
Vadlamannati, K. (2011)). In the case of Nepal, Deraniyagala examines the economic 
causes of the civil conflict. He finds that relative deprivation and related economic 
grievances are key casual factors in the conflict. The resulting civil instability is found to 
be a byproduct of uneven development policies during a period of economic 
liberalization (Deraniyagala 2005).  Oyefusi’s analysis of civil conflict in the oil 
producing region of Nigeria utilizes extensive surveys of combat aged men in the area. 
He finds that increasing individual levels of income reduce the probability of men joining 
a rebellion against the state (Oyefusi 2008). Lastly, Vadlamannati examines local data to 
understand how economic conditions and political violence in North East India are tied 
together. He finds that poverty (relative to other areas of  India) has a substantial effect 
on the outbreak of civil violence. Each of these studies highlights the inherent value in 
conducting localized analysis to provide greater fidelity to broader statistical results. 
While case studies and localized statistical analysis are essential, a shortcoming is that 
while data can be shown to correlate with each other, the lack of a coherent conceptual 
model that allows us to understand the evolution of political violence is missing. If the 
current models for economic determinants of civil conflict are insufficient then we 
require a new construct for which political violence can evolve into many forms.        
 
Revisiting Relative Deprivation as a Motive for Protest, Revolt, and Civil War 
 
This chapter thus far has presented the literature that appears to be most relevant in the 
discussion on the major determinants of civil conflict in human society. I am  specifically 
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interested in exploring how the economic condition of individuals acts as a determinant 
of protest and possible revolt. I explore the conceptual space of how changes to 
individual’s condition affect the larger system. Changes to relative deprivation, both in its 
magnitude, its distribution, and its rate of change are all likely to provide disparate 
outcomes that are worth exploring. The results from this exercise are aimed to provide 
both conceptual insights and propositions that could be testable if and when suitable data 
is made available. Therefore, I do not discuss in detail the political, religious, or socio-
demographic characteristics of persons as possible motivators for them to rebel against 
the state. Instead, I argue that individual economic condition such as a person’s general 
level of utility are an important determinant of hardship and serves as a motivator for 
growing mass protest against the state which if left unchecked can serve as the basis for a 
general revolt of the populace. 
The investigation of the literature thus far has been specific to the scholarly works 
investigating the economic conditions for which individuals decide to engage in protest, 
revolt, or full rebellion against the state authority. These studies primarily utilize case 
study research and econometric analysis using large data sets. The first research method 
although extremely informative for the specific example is more difficult to broadly 
apply, while the second method crudely defines civil conflict (e.g 1000 deaths per year), 
utilizes country-wide average measures of proposed determinants, and is unable to shed 
light on the dynamic conditions leading to  emergent phenomenon. Researchers have 
shown that macro level data often misses important signs of growing dissent within the 
populace, arguing that localized event data is a better predictor of protest (Jones 2007). 
To develop higher granularity data sets requires not only financial resources, but are 
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frequently undertaken in difficult conditions and often in areas that threaten the safety of 
the researchers themselves. Because of the inherent cost and difficulty of gathering high 
resolution data, the first step in developing higher resolution analysis is conceptual 
exploration. This dissertation is an attempt to conceptually explore micro level dynamics 
of civil conflict, specifically how economic condition influences the evolution localized 
protest and revolt. This has the benefit of not only allowing for a better theoretical 
understanding of what is transpiring at the local level, but serves a practical purpose in 
defining what data would be useful in understanding the relationship between economic 
conditions and the emergence of civil conflict. Utilizing a modified form of the 
Brookings Model, I demonstrate that changes to individual deprivation in the form of 
average utility and its distribution in a system of agents determines the onset, frequency, 
and magnitude of protest.  I discuss the methodology of the model in Chapter 3 with 
findings in the model discussed more broadly in Chapters 4 and 5.    
Moving from Individual Economic Condition and towards Individual Grievance  
 
The decision to engage in protest and subsequently conflict against the state is an 
inherently personal choice that is driven by an individual’s condition and their 
understanding of the external conditions they face in the society (e.g the presence of 
security forces, what other citizens are doing, etc). The individual as a singular entity or 
as part of a identified group experiences what Gurr refers to as relative deprivation. The 
change to relative deprivation can come from a variety of different source: loss of a job, a 
pay cut, reduction to purchasing power (e. g inflation), or cuts in public transfer 
payments. The gap between their capability and their expected outcome measures the size 
of the deprivation. Therefore, while either a job loss or a cut to a government subsidy 
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might cause an increase in their relative deprivation, the loss of a job is likely to lead to 
greater hardship.  The relative deprivation in turn leads to grievance if the situation can 
be assigned to a specific entity (e.g state or another individual). If the deprivation 
increase is simply a result of their own actions, such as being fired for incompetence, the 
hardship they face is unlikely to emerge as grievance against another entity. Grievance 
against the state therefore emerges when an individual or group of individuals assign the 
source of their deprivation to the central government authority. In the simplest case, an 
individual who is experiencing extreme economic hardship, and who sees government 
inaction or policy as the root of that condition, might turn that angst to engage in some 
form of protest. That protest might be purely expressive in form with the image of a 
person standing on the corner yelling about the transgressions of the state on the people 
or in the attacking of a representative of the state. The intention of the protestor is likely 
not to radically transform a legislative agenda, but more to express their discontent. It is 
not infrequent to see individuals during tough economic times erecting tent cities 
protesting. The “Occupy Wall Street” movement, albeit aimed at corporate entities, is a 
good example of this phenomenon. However, the grievance people feel might also turn 
more violent if that individual decides to cause harm to themselves or others as a way of 
drawing attention to the problem or as an expression of pure frustration against a system 
they are individually powerless to change. This instrumental form of protest is likely to 
have deeper aims than a simple statement of frustration. The self-immolation of 
Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia demonstrates a expressive form of protest, while the 




From Individual Grievance towards the emergence of Mass Protest   
 
While the motivations of an individual to vent his frustrations are easy to understand, 
what becomes more challenging to researchers is how that individual disaffection, even 
when shared by others, transforms into a mass protest. At the heart of the problem is 
again an individual’s analysis on the likelihood of being successful in venting their 
discontent while not being arrested or killed by state forces. The cost of being the first 
person to demonstrate and thereby bear all the costs of that action is the heart of the 
collective action problem. From an instrumental standpoint no one wants to be the first 
person to protest if the costs of that protest are high and the probability of policy change 
is slim. In free societies where peaceful protest is permitted, the costs of protest are 
minimized as long as peaceful assembly is maintained. Therefore, the cost to the 
individual standing on the corner yelling about the transgressions of the state is 
effectively nothing. However, in less free societies even peaceful protest could be met 
with arrest, injury, or possibly even death. Therefore no single individual, unless highly 
risk tolerant or doing it for expressive reasons, is likely to be the first to protest their state 
of affairs. Instead, they may seek a private regress of grievance, or simply muddle 
through the hardship they are experiencing. However, if other citizens who are voicing 
similar concerns are seen by an individual who harbors similar thoughts, the potential for 




Figure 1: Protest Numbers in Tunisia during the Jasmine Revolution 
 
In large enough groups, the costs will be minimized to such a degree that it is effectively 
reduced to zero encouraging an exponential increase in the numbers of persons 
protesting. This might occur because the number of security forces in a specific 
geography in the short-run are relatively fixed thereby reducing the ratio of protesters to 
security forces as the collective action grows
4
. As the protest expands, security forces 
might intercede and seek to disperse the gathering. Thus, protests can take the form of 
rapidly increasing protest followed by its quick dispersal. This is known as a punctuated 
protest. Figure 1 highlights this phenomenon by graphing the number of protestors during 
the Tunisian revolution. This figure demonstrates that while the press characterized a 
general revolt amongst the populace in Tunisia, the form that action took included the 
emergence of protest, followed by its collapse. The reemergence of protest after police 
                                                     
4
 The collective action problem is outlined in Mancur Olson’s “Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods 
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action demonstrates that the underlying grievance of individuals (e.g their relative 
deprivation) remained unchanged. The introduction of security forces including the use of 
tear gas broke up the immediate protest, but failed to solve the underlying problem 
driving the civil unrest.  The cycle repeats until the government was toppled in early 
2011, satisfying protestor demands and leading to the quelling of protest among the 
citizenry.  
The emergence of individual angst into collective protest against the government stems 
from a myriad of issues unique in character and weighting to each situation. However, we 
might find that in general that personal hardship, the level of perceived legitimacy of the 
government, the actions of other citizens to either protest or not, and the presence of 
security forces who can maintain the peace or repress citizen action are important. 
Significant changes to the initial condition of personal hardship either in its absolute 
magnitude or to its distribution should have a material effect on the emergence of mass 
protest, ceteris paribus. Accordingly I  explore the proposition that changes to individual 
condition, on average, in distribution or over time, have an impact on the emergence, 
size, and magnitude of mass protest. To test this proposition, I utilize a modified form of 
the Brookings Model to test the effect of these changing conditions.     
Transforming Personal Grievance into Mass Protest: A New Approach on a Old Model       
 
To approach the problem of understanding how a change to individual condition affects 
the emergence of protest, I utilize a agent based model framework derived from the 
Brookings Institution’s “Rebellion” model. The Brookings Model was the first attempt to 
understand the emergence of protest in a agent based system. The model utilizes many of 
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the concepts already touched upon in this paper: government legitimacy, hardship, 
grievance, security services, and risk tolerance. However, the Brookings model does not 
allow for changes in agent hardship on average either across the system or to its 
distribution. Second, it does not allow for changes to agent hardship over time.  
I show that these small changes to the model have wildly different impacts on the 
emergence of mass protest. In many cases, the results confirm centuries old propositions 
about the relationship between increasing levels of hardship and protest (e.g the bread 
riot). However, some surprising results do emerge from the model regarding the effect of 
distribution on the emergence of protest.  In chapter 3, I discuss the methodology of the 
original Brookings model and the changes I make in the model. Chapter 4 discusses the 
results of the revised model in which no changes to individual condition occur over time 
(e.g Static). In chapter 5, I present finding associated with the dynamic model which 
allows for a system of agents to respond to changes in individual condition. This 
dissertation does not directly compare the model results with real world events because 
the lack of data available at sufficient granularity to verify the propositions in this paper 
puts it beyond our current abilities. Instead, the model generates insights that could be 




Chapter 3: Methodology for Understanding Civil Conflict   
“In perpetrating a revolution, there are two requirements: someone or something to 
revolt against and someone to actually show up and do the revolting. Dress is 
usually casual and both parties may be flexible about time and place, but if either 
faction fails to attend, the whole enterprise is likely to come off badly.” 
-Woody Allen 
 
Understanding the determinants of civil conflict remains an open research question 
despite the considerable efforts over the past decade. Empirical modeling in particular 
has been used to draw stronger conclusions between human behavior and its underlying 
causes. Yet, this is an inherently complicated task as interactions between factors are not 
easily teased out through simple mathematical or statistical models based on insufficient 
data sets. Researchers over the past decade have highlighted this challenge, empirically 
testing and validating some determinants, yet failing to reach consensus on others. The 
problem with many of the empirical approaches is both one of conception and one of 
data. The current state of the field currently lacks a coherent and evolutionary approach 
to individual economic condition and the outbreak of civil violence. While tremendous 
effort has been exerted to develop a “greed” theory that eschews individualized grievance 
factors and focuses on the benefits derived to would-be rebels it fails to account for how 
protest evolves into revolt and finally rebellion. Serious challenges can be made about the 
interpretation of greed variables that would provide evidence for a grievance theory of 
economic determination of civil conflict. Second the lack of data at local levels severely 
limits the ability to both test current propositions as well as help form new theory on 
localized civil conflict. Unfortunately the collection of data at a sufficient granularity can 
be both inherently dangerous as well as extremely resource intensive. Therefore it is 
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important to first conceptually explore how local dynamics contribute to emergent civil 
instability to help identify key data useful for empirical testing.     
I  attempt to add to this conversation by utilizing a different modeling approach, 
conceptually exploring how changes to agent utility, both in magnitude and in its 
distribution, affect the emergence of civil protest.  The models and results presented  
demonstrate that the economic condition of the individual is a central determinant for the 
size, frequency, onset, and evolution of civil conflict.  While some results are intuitive 
(e.g greater hardship associated with greater magnitude protest), others provide fresh 
insight into the complexities of inequality and economic growth. This chapter discusses 
the approach I take in defining my modeling approach and how it builds on previous 
work done in this area to develop a new method useful in exploring concepts in changing 
conditions for individuals and their behavior in a defined system. I expand the Brookings 
model by changing the distribution used to examine utility, thereby allowing me to 
change the average level of utility, its variance, and allow for changes over time. The first 
section of this chapter briefly defines some key terms used in the model, the second 
section discusses the model class I will be using, while the third section discusses the 
Brookings Model that is used as a starting point for my work in this area. The last section 
thoroughly discusses changes made to the original model made for the purposes of this 
dissertation.   
Defining Utility, Protest, Revolt, and Rebellion: How are we Measuring Economic 




The first question we have to answer before we begin our discussion of agent based 
modeling is what we exactly mean by economic condition and civil conflict. This 
dissertation attempts to use a generic and broad concept of economic condition of the 
individual. I use both the terms utility and distribution as a way to generally talk about 
how individuals are fairing in a society. I formally use the following utility definition of 
utility to encompass all of the benefit derived by an individual from consuming goods 
and services that are either purchased with their own income or provided by another 
source (e.g state). In this sense, this measure quantifies all goods and services the 
individual consumes thereby capturing both individually acquired goods (e.g private 
income) as well as state provided services and subsidies.  
The second term used to describe economic condition of individuals is distribution, 
specifically distribution of utility. This term is used in two ways. The first is the 
traditional definition to describe the shape of data relative to its frequency of occurrence 
(e.g uniform and normal distributions). I also use the word distribution when referring to 
the standard deviation or variance about the mean. References to the relative dispersion 
away from the mean and is used to measure changes in inequality of utility. Formally this 
is represented by the standard deviation from the mean. Therefore smaller standard 
deviations are associated with higher levels of utility equality, and higher standard 
deviations are associated with greater inequality.  
The next set of terms that need a formal treatment in this section are terms that are used 
frequently but often mean different things to different people: protest, revolt, and 
rebellion. This paper specifically deals with protest and revolt. I define protest as activity 
where citizens engage in either violent or nonviolent action against the state. During 
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protest, the state maintains control and has the ability to deploy security forces to disperse 
protesters. In the model protest is identified by an eruption of protestors who eventually 
turn quiet as security forces intervene. This activity is associated with punctuated protests 
similar to what we saw in Figure 1 in the preceding chapter.  
Revolt is a more serious situation where citizens are engaging in violent or nonviolent 
protest against the state, but where the security forces are unable to control and quell 
citizen action. Unlike protest, which exhibits punctuated citizen activity, revolt generates 
an equilibrium condition where protesters remain persistent in their voicing of grievance. 
This distinction allows us to examine the model results with an eye towards evolutionary 
change where a stable system can move to protest and finally revolt. 
Rebellion follows revolt and one where citizens engage in coordinated violence against 
the state, and where central authority is taking direct military action against rebels. I do 
not model rebellion in this paper, and while the Brookings Model discusses rebels, it is 
primarily a model of protest with no citizens being killed (only jailed).  
Agent Based Modeling: An Approach to Understanding Complex Behavior 
 
The computer models utilized in this paper are a class of simulation known as Agent 
Based Models (ABM). ABM simulations attempt to “grow” emergent phenomenon by 
observing behavior through simple interactions amongst individual agents. Utilized by 
physical and social scientists to understand complex interactions, ABMs provide useful 
insight into how group behaviors emerge enabling us to both understand how simple 
behavior informs complex system dynamics, as well as serve to test policy interventions 
that might alter those outcomes. The model is therefore not used as a predictive tool for 
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real world scenarios, but as a means of understanding system outcomes that help inform 
other research approaches to the problem. ABMs are a ideal candidate for addressing 
civil conflict as it is episodic in nature and is affected my local level dynamics. In a study 
of Guatemalan civil violence, Gulden finds that civil violence is driven by localized 
conditions and is not a continuous activity (Gulden 2004). Unlike statistical approaches, 
ABMs can address this issue as they incorporate geography and adaptive behavior by 
individuals.  
Emergent behavior is a phenomenon whereby well-formulated aggregated behavior arises 
from localized, individual behavior (Miller & Page, 2007).  Whereas mathematical and 
statistical models capture the aggregated affect and determine relationships based on 
those results, ABM models define conditions at the local level and examine the individual 
interactions that lead to the larger emerging behavior in the system. This effort “grows” 
complex behavior from seemingly simple agent interaction. The ability to examine the 
dynamics of a complex social system provides deeper insight and helps form theories 
based on our knowledge of local attitudes that may be testable later through statistical 
methods. 
The Brookings Model 
 
The first effort to date utilizing an ABM framework to study civil violence was 
conducted by the scholars at Brookings Institution and Santa Fe Institute. They presented 
two variations of a framework exploring initial conditions of unorganized civil conflict 
(Epstein, Steinbruner, Parker 2001).  The first model analyzes the dynamics of 
decentralized rebellion against a central government authority. The second model 
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represents the emergence of violence between two ethnic groups. For purposes of 
discussion in this paper, I focus on the structure of the first model and its corresponding 
results. I refer to this as the “Brookings” model.   
The Brookings Model has two types of actors: citizens and cops. The first type of actor, 
known as , is representative of an individual in society. The agent is a heterogeneous 
actor in several aspects including perceived hardship, legitimacy of the central 
government, individual risk aversion, and finally the knowledge, or vision, of what is 
happening in the local proximity (Epstein, Steinbruner, Parker 2001). 
Hardship (H): This represents the individual citizen’s level of perceived hardship. The 
Brookings Model defines this variable as exogenous taken from a uniform distribution 
between 0 and 1.      
Legitimacy (L): This represents the perceived legitimacy of the central authority. This 
variable is exogenously provided by the researcher and is constant amongst all agents 
with a value between 0 and 1.  
Grievance (G): This represents one part of the citizen’s decision to rebel against a central 
authority and is a function of both their individual hardship and the perception of the 
central government’s legitimacy. The simple calculation of grievance follows as: 
G=H(1-L) 
The authors note that the impetus for the grievance calculation is such that agents with 
high levels of hardship are less likely to rebel in societies with highly legitimate 
governments. They cite the example of the London Blitz during World War II as an 
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example where extreme hardship was imposed on the populace, but given their resolve 
and support of the central government, no civil violence emerged. Likewise, a highly 
illegitimate government is more likely to see civil disruption in the presence of increasing 
hardship.  
Risk Aversion (R):  This represents the citizen’s individual risk aversion. This variable is 
heterogeneous across agents and is taken from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. 
This variable does not change during the citizen’s lifetime. 
Citizen Vision (v):  This value represents the number of positions on the lattice that the 
agent can see that might be occupied by other agents and cops. Since the citizen’s vision 
is limited, information is local to its position.  
Estimated Arrest Probability (P): This represents the probability that an agent is arrested. 
The citizen’s calculus for estimating its arrest probability is a function of the local ratio of 
the number of cops to active agents in their field of vision. The authors note that the logic 
behind this estimate is such that citizens are less likely to be arrested when more citizens 
are rebelling, citing that it is less risky to be the 10,001
st
 rebelling citizen versus the first.   
P =        
 
 
   
Citizen Net Risk of Arrest (N): This represents the citizen’s overall risk of arrest. This 
incorporates not only the probability of risk but also the consequence of being caught, 
namely being placed in jail for a period of time.  
N=RP   
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The citizen’s net risk is a function therefore of the citizen’s own Risk Aversion (R), 
estimated arrest probability (P), and finally the jail-term (J). 
Citizen Decision Rule (Rule A): Based on the identified citizen characteristics cited 
above the agents make decisions to rebel when grievance minus their net risk of arrest is 
greater than some threshold T.   
If G-N>T be Active; Otherwise, be Quiet 
The second type of actor in the Brookings Model is a cop. Cops represent the security 
forces of the central government and arrest any active agents. Cops unlike the agents 
have only a single variable, their vision (v*). 
Vision (v*): This is the cop vision, or the number of lattice positions that the cop is able 
to inspect. It is exogenous across all cops. The cops have one rule: 
 Cop Rule C: Inspect all sites within v* and arrest a random active citizen. 
The authors cite five major findings from their runs of the Brookings Model. The central 
findings from the model include: 
1) Citizens engage in deceptive behavior changing their status based on the presence 
of cops; 
2) Free assembly catalyzes rebellious outbursts, with congregations of citizens to 
precede a outburst of activity; 
3) The model generates periods of punctuated protest where periods of quiet are 
followed by extreme activity among citizens; 
42 
 
4) The emergent behavior finds that there all exists a distribution of the outburst size 
and their frequency  
5) They find that there is an index for the ripeness of protest serving to identify 
tension in the system. 
Those results are explored in detail in Epstein 2001 and in Epstein, Steinbruner, and 
Parker 2002, and are not discussed in this paper. A limitation of the Brookings Model is 
the inability to change the hardship of citizens in the model. The imposition of a uniform 
distribution on the hardship variable, effectively fixes the variable at 0.5. The central aim 
of the Brookings Model was not meant to represent a detailed exploration of each citizen 
motivation, more to demonstrate the type of results that can be obtained through ABM 
modeling. This limitation however serves as a motivation for this paper to explore the 
conceptual insights we can obtain through changes to this measure of ’s economic 
condition.  
Introducing the Revised Brookings Model: The ODD Framework 
 
The complexity of ABMs has traditionally made them difficult for researchers to have a 
full understanding of the underlying dynamics built into a model. These complexities 
have lead to concerns by some researchers who have had difficulty in replicating the 
results of some of the models. In 2006 several experienced modelers (Grimm et al 2006) 
published a procedure for researchers using ABM designs to give readers a understanding 
of the underlying processes, decision calculus, and adaptive behavior built into a model. 
The framework put forth and largely adapted by researchers has been identified as the  
Overview, Design Concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol. It lays out a means from which 
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a reader can understand the basics of the model, how it is designed, programmed, and the 
values that are defined within the model (endogenity) versus what values emerge from 
the interactions between agents. The ODD protocol is divided into three major sections 
each with a series of underlying topics that the modeler should address: The overview of 
the model to include its purpose and process overview, the major design concepts, and 
the details of the model to include the initial setup and input data. To better equip the 
reader with a understanding of how the model was designed and implemented for the 
simulation runs in the next chapter I have used the ODD protocol. A detailed description 
of each element of the protocol is found in the appendix of this paper. 
 
ODD Protocol: How is the model related to previous thinking about the problem it 
addresses? 
The modified Brookings Model builds on the initial work of Josh Epstein, John 
Steinbruner, and Miles Parker at the Brookings Institution. The original model looks at 
the effects that government legitimacy, agent hardship, and security forces have on the 
emergence of civil violence. The original Brookings Model was successful in unifying in 
an ABM construct, some major proposed causes of civil violence.   
The original Brookings model develops relatively simple decision logic amongst agents 
in a system. At its core, agents decide to rebel if the level of grievance minus the arrest 
probability is greater than a threshold set by the researcher. More simply stated, when ’s 
grievance overwhelms the anticipated risk of capture by security forces by some margin, 
he rebels. Grievance is a function of the level of hardship imposed on the agent and on 
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the citizen’s perception of the government’s legitimacy. The level of hardship for each 
agent is a randomly assigned value from a uniform distribution, while the legitimacy of 
government is an exogenously conferred value from the researcher. The estimated risk of 
being arrested is a function of the number of security forces in the vicinity of the citizen 
and the number of rebelling agents in the same area.  
The first major divergence from the Brookings model changes the distribution of utility 
(e.g hardship) in the system. In the original model, hardship for each citizen is randomly 
assigned a value between 0 and 1 from a uniform distribution. This variable is assigned 
during the setup of the simulation and does not change during the entire run. There are 
two problems with this approach. First, the original model assumes a mean hardship of 
0.5 no matter how many times the model is run. Second, the imposition of the uniform 
distribution evenly distributes hardship between the lower bound of zero and an upper 
bound of one. By imposing a consistent mean of 0.5 and a uniform distribution, the 
original model can only test one specific case of hardship. The ability to modify these 
initial conditions opens up a new avenue of research that sheds light on the relationship 
between average utility, distribution, and the emergence of rebellion.    
Brookings Model Grievance Calculation 
G=H(1-L) 
Where:  
G = Grievance 
H = Hardship uniformly distributed between 0 and 1  




Revised Grievance Calculation in Model of Rebellion (Utility is Constant between 
Periods) 
G = (1-   )(1-L) 
Where: 
G = Grievance 
U = Utility ~ N      
L = Legitimacy 
n = Time Period n 
 
The second major change to the original Brookings model incorporates the dimension of 
time. This new dimension to the model allows us to evaluate how changes in the utility, 
and the variability of that change over all agents, affects the emergence of violence. To 
achieve this, the calculation of utility is expanded from the grievance equation above to 
incorporate a citizen’s utility values, weighted, over the current period t and the previous 
6 periods. The function is weighted such that nearer term utility are counted more than 
previous   values. The equation represented below calculates its grievance as the product 
of their perception of the central governments legitimacy and their relative economic 
condition averaged over the previous six periods. By averaging the economic condition 
of the citizen we can smooth how a person values their utility level thereby reducing the 
chance that a single period change in ’s utility greatly changes the weighted utility level.  




Where for each ith citizen, and each time period (n) and             
              
 
G = Grievance   
U = Utility ~N      
L = Legitimacy 
                                       
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
ODD Protocol: What is the Purpose of the Model? 
 
The revised Brookings model expands on our understanding of how the interactions 
between utility, legitimacy, and security forces affect decisions by citizens to rebel.  To 
achieve these ends, the original Brookings Model is modified to allow changes to average 
citizen utility, utility distribution, and to allow for changes to utility over time. 
 
This revised model deviates from the original Brookings model in two major ways. First, 
exploration of citizen hardship and its relationship with outbreaks of protest are limited in 
the Brookings Model by not allowing for changes in the mean utility or to its distribution. 
The revised model addresses this shortcoming by allowing for changes to both the mean 
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and distribution. Second, the original Brookings Model does not allow for changes to 
hardship over time limiting exploration of how changes over time might affect emergent 
protest. Modification to both allows for an expansion in our understanding of the 
relationship between utility levels, distribution, and their affect on individual’s decisions 
for rebellion.  
 
ODD Protocol: What is the problem that you are trying to address? 
 
The changes to the model were primarily driven by a desire to conceptually explore how 
changes to utility levels, its distribution in a system, and changes to it over time affect 
emergent protest. This problem has not been addressed by previous research efforts. 
Specifically this model attempts to answer several key questions: 
 What is the effect of differing levels of average utility on the frequency and 
magnitude of rebellion? 
 What is the effect of differing utility distributions on the frequency and magnitude 
of rebellion? 
 What is the relationship between “poor” utility agents and the outbreak of 
rebellion? 
 How does declining mean utility over time impact the emergence of rebellion? 
 How does declining mean utility, with variability, impact the emergence of 
rebellion? 
 How does differing starting utility distribution affect the magnitude and frequency 
of rebellion?  
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Each of these questions are addressed by variations of the model that allow runs at 
regular intervals of mean utility and specific distribution levels to more completely 
explore the conceptual space providing concrete findings.  
ODD Protocol: What are the things that are represented in the model?  
 
The model represents a system of citizens who make decisions to either rebel or stay 
quiet given specific exogenous variables, the presence of security forces, and the 
rebelling status of neighboring citizens. As in the original Brookings Model, the system 
specifically represents two types of actors, cops and citizens
5
. Cops represent security 
forces that are in charge of identifying rebelling agents and putting them in jail. Agents 
are civilians who based on their hardship, perceived legitimacy of government, and their 
risk calculus of being arrested and jailed make decisions about whether to engage in 
rebellion. The model outputs include the number of people rebelling, the number of 
agents jailed, the average level of discontent, and a measure of persons about to rebel. 
The outputs are displayed through the lattice interface and through a series of charts. 
ODD Protocol: What are the variables used to characterize them? 
 
The two types of computer actors in this model are citizens and cops. The citizen is 
represented as a circle in the lattice, while the cop is represented as a triangle. While the 
cop only has a single variable (vision) which informs their ability to see rebelling 
citizens, the citizen has both endogenous and exogenous variables that inform their 
behavior.  The citizen’s characteristics include: 
                                                     
5
 The Brookings model defines citizens as agents, however cops are also agents so to reduce confusion I 




Risk Aversion (R): This is a value for the citizen that is their internal value that would 
characterize them as either risk taking or more risk adverse. 
Utility (    : This is a value for the current period’s utility (n). In this model, there is a 
significant divergence from the Brookings “Rebellion” model in that it substitutes 
“Utility” for “Hardship”.         
utilityn-1 (     ): This is a value for the “n-1” period of an citizen’s utility. This value is 
used as an citizen’s memory of their previous period’s utility value. 
utilityn-2 (      : This is a value for the “n-2” period of an citizen’s utility. This value is 
used as an citizen’s memory for two periods previous to the current period. 
utilityn-3        : This is a value for the “n-3” period of an citizen’s utility. This value is 
used as an citizen’s memory for three periods previous to the current period. 
utilityn-4 (      : This is a value for the “n-4” period of an citizen’s utility. This value is 
used as an citizen’s memory for four  periods previous to the current period. 
utilityn-5 (      : This is a value for the “n-5” period of an citizen’s utility. This value is 
used as an citizen’s memory for five periods previous to the current period.                               
active?: This is a variable for the citizen that defines if they are in a state of rebellion   
(Value of 1) or are quiet (Value of 0).             
jailterm: This characteristic represents how many turns an citizen still has in jail. 




The two types of actors in the model represent individuals (citizens) and security forces 
(cops). Individuals, or citizens in the model, are representative of persons in a society 
who make decisions to either rebel or stay quiet. The security forces, cops in the model, 
are representative of forces tied to the government who are charged with maintaining 
order in the model.  
ODD Protocol: What is the environment they live in?  
 
The simulated environment does not represent any specific terrain, as it does not 
incorporate any features such as mountains, forests, or buildings that would inhibit 
movement. The lattice is meant to represent an abstract space focusing on citizen 
interaction. The model is a localized environment and does utilize the notion of 
neighborhoods, focusing citizen risk calculus on the number of security forces within a 
neighborhood. The model allows for wrapping thereby allowing citizens to move from 
one side of the lattice to the other.  The model’s physical landscape is a 33x33 lattice 
structure. 
 
ODD Protocol: What are the values the citizens possess? 
 
The citizen defines some of the values of its variables during the set-up of the model, 
while others will change over time. The values of the previous defined characteristics are 
as follows:  
risk-aversion: This value is set-up at the start of the model and is a uniformly defined 
variable  between the values of 0 and 1 The value for each citizen does not change during 
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the run of the model. 
utility      : This value is defined as a random variable within a normal distribution with 
a mean and standard deviation defined by the user. For the purposes of the model runs, 
the value for the mean is tested at the following intervals: 0.9, 0.8, 0.7,0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.35, 
0.3, 0.2, and 0.1. The standard deviation for each mean is run with the following values: 
0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, and 0.20.          
utilityn-1       : The initial value is defined as the value of utilityn. With each 
subsequent time period in the model the value for utilityn-1 becomes the value of utilityn 
in the previous period. This allows for the retention of the utility value from the previous 
period when the model allows for utility change per period. Utility is either added or 
decremented determined by the user. The user can also determine the distribution of 
additional utility added in each model iteration. This allows for either an equal 
distribution of growth or some variance in growth. For the dynamic model runs I assume 
a variance of zero (equal distribution). 
utilityn-2       : The initial value is defined as the value of utilityn. With each 
subsequent time period in the model the value for utilityn-2 becomes the value of utilityn-
1 in the previous period.  This allows for the retention of the utility value from the 
previous period when the model allows for utility change per period. 
utilityn-3        : The initial value is defined as the value of utilityn. With each 
subsequent time period in the model the value for utilityn-3 becomes the value of utilityn-
2 in the previous period.  This allows for the retention of the utility value from the 




utilityn-4        : The initial value is defined as the value of utilityn. With each 
subsequent time period in the model the value for utilityn-4 becomes the value of utilityn-
3 in the previous period.  This allows for the retention of the utility value from the 
previous period when the model allows for utility change per period. 
utilityn-5        : The initial value is defined as the value of utilityn. With each 
subsequent time period in the model the value for utilityn-5 becomes the value of utilityn-
4 in the previous period.  This allows for the retention of the utility value from the 
previous period when the model allows for utility change per period. 
active?: This is a variable for the citizen that defines if they are in a state of rebellion   
(Value of 1) or are quiet (Value of 0).   The initial condition for this variable is set to 
zero, but can be set to 1 each period if an citizen’s decision calculus is met. That decision 
calculus is discussed later in this section.          
 
jailterm: Is initially set to zero. If the citizen is caught rebelling, this value is set to a 
random variable between 0 and a maximum term defined by the user. In this model the 
maximum jail-term is set at 15 periods. 
ODD Protocol: What are time dependent elements? 
The citizen’s internal calculation of grievance in this model is a function of changes in 
utility, and to the citizen’s perception of government legitimacy. For the purposes of the 
simulation, legitimacy is held constant across all citizens and time. Citizen utility 
however can change based on user inputs at the start of each model run. The first set of 
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simulation runs assume no utility changes, referred to as static runs, thereby tying each 
utility variable to the initial value set at the beginning of the model.   The second set of 
simulation runs do allow for changes in utility over time, referred to as dynamic runs, and 
therefore can alter grievance calculations over time.  The dynamic model constructs the 
grievance value for each citizen as: 
                                                           * (1-L) 
Where for each ith citizen, and each time period (n) and            > 0 
G = Grievance   
U = Utility N      
L = Legitimacy 
                                       
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
The weighting of utility in the grievance citizen decision equation allows for the user to 
define nearer term utility values as having greater significance on the citizen than 
previous values. The model holds utility weightings for all citizens constant (e.g. all 
citizens weight utility in time periods the same). The weighting values used in the 
dynamic model runs from period n through period n-5 are: 0.5, 0.25, 0.125, 0.06, 0.03, 
0.015.   
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The method used to calculate the citizen’s arrest probability is the one used in the original 
Brookings model.  Although it changes over time with the ratio of active cops to active 
citizens it is not time dependent. 
                                     
 
 
   
C = Number of Cops within a neighborhood 
A = 1+ number of active citizens in a neighborhood 
ODD Protocol: What are the model entities doing? 
 
The behavior of the actors in the model is relatively simple. At the most basic level, 
citizens and cops move, citizens determine their behavior (e.g rebel or stay quiet), and 
cops enforce (e.g arrest citizens). 
The first thing that happens in the model is the “move” procedure. Citizens and cops 
identify and then move to open spaces in the lattice structure. Limitations to this action 
are tied to the relative density of the lattice structure. With greater numbers of citizens 
movement in the structure could be constrained. 
Movement Rule M: Move to a random site within your vision. 
The second action called in the model is the “determine-behavior” procedure. This 
procedure is run for each citizen and determines if an citizen should rebel or stay quiet for 
that period of time. If an citizen’s grievance minus their assigned risk aversion multiplied 
by the estimated arrest probability  is greater than an exogenously determined threshold, 
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the citizen will rebel, if not they will remain quiet.  This is the same function rule as in 
the original Brookings Model. 
Citizen Rule A: If G-N>T be Active; Otherwise, be Quiet 
The last action called in the model is the “enforce” procedure. This procedure is run for 
each cop, and asks each one to identify a rebelling citizen within their “vision”, move to 
that location, and then arrest that citizen. That cop is able to change the jail-term variable 
for the rebelling citizen thereby removing them from other citizens’ view. This simulates 
an citizen being removed from the system thereby eliminating their participation in a 
rebellion. The citizen maintains their last utility level until they are released. It is 
believable that their utility level would decline as the person would likely have lost their 
job or suffered other consequences, but I do not address this issue in the model.   
Cop Rule C: Inspect all sites within v* and arrest a random Active Citizen. 
ODD Protocol: What behaviors do the citizens execute as simulated time proceeds? 
 
There are two major behavioral changes in the model as the simulation progresses. The 
first is an citizen behavioral change. An citizen will begin to rebel and no longer stay 
quiet based on changes to utility, the behavior of other citizens, or through the presence 
of cops. The second is a behavioral change to cops. When citizens are not rebelling 
within their field of vision, cops move normally, akin to being on a patrol. When citizens 
are rebelling in their field of vision however, cops will move purposefully towards the 
rebelling citizens. There is a slight difference between the original Brookings model and 
the one implemented in this approximation. In the original model the cops do not move to 
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the same space where the agent is active, however in this version cops do move to be on 
top of the protesting citizen. While both approximations are defendable, it is important to 
acknowledge the difference. 
ODD Protocol: What is the schedule of the model? 
 
The modified Brookings Model cycles through five major actions for each time interval.  
The user starts the model by selecting the “Go” button which calls the “Go”  procedure. 
The model conducts a test to see if an citizen jail-term is 0 or if the breed is a cop. If this 
value is true, then the move procedure (Rule M) is called. The code is as follows: 
 
 to go 
   ask turtles                                               
[ 
     if (breed = agents and jailterm = 0) or breed = cops    
         [  
           Move                                             
 
The move procedure directs citizens or cops to move to squares that are not occupied, in 
a random manner. The second part of the move procedure shifts utility values back by 
one period. This process allows the citizen to maintain a “memory” of utility levels. The 
second part of the procedure bounds the values of utility between 0 and 1. Values of 
utility that are above one are set to 1, while a utility value that is less than zero is set to 
zero.  The last part of the procedure then resets the present utility figure to be the current 
value of utility (utilityn) plus a random increment with a mean and standard deviation 




 to move 
  if movement? or (breed = cops)                    
    [ 
  let targets neighborhood with                    
            [ 
              not any? cops-here and all? agents-here      
                 [ jailterm > 0] 
            ] 
   if any? targets                                  
             [ 
               move-to one-of targets 
 
set utilityn-5 utilityn-4                                     ; Sets Utility in N-5 as Utility in N-4  
set utilityn-4 utilityn-3                                     ; Sets Utility in N-4 as Utility in N-3 
set utilityn-3 utilityn-2                                     ; Sets Utility in N-3 as Utility in N-2                                               
set utilityn-2 utilityn-1                                     ; Sets Utility in N-2 as Utility in N-1 
set utilityn-1 utilityn                                        ; Sets Utility in N-1 as Utility in N 
 
if utilityn > 1                                  
   [ 
      set utilityn 1                                 
   ] 
    if utilityn < 0                                  
    [ 
      set utilityn 0                                 
    ]     
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    set utilityn utilityn + random-normal mean-income stddev-income          
    end      
 
After the “move” procedure is called, the model then calls the “determine-behavior” 
procedure to determine if an citizen will be active (rebel).  If the condition is met then the 
model will set an citizen as active (e.g. Rebelling). The procedure is identical to the 
original Brookings model, however, the individual citizen grievance in the model is 
expanded in this simulation to account for changes to initial utility mean, standard 
deviation, while allowing for change over time.  
 
 to determine-behavior 




After citizen behavior is determined the simulation asks all cops to run the enforce 
procedure which moves cops within the vision constraint to move and arrest an active 
citizen. Upon reaching an active citizen, the cop resets the citizen’s jail term to a random 
number with an upper limit imposed by the setting at the start of the model run.   
 
 if breed = cops                                         
 [  





Once  movement, agent behavior determination, and cop enforcement procedures have 
been executed, any citizen that has a jail-term of greater than 0 has their sentence reduced 
by one. 
ask agents                                                
   [ 
       if jailterm > 0                                         
        [  
        set jailterm jailterm - 1             
The last major action called is to modify the appearance of the citizens in the simulation. 
If an citizen is rebelling, it will change the color from green to red. If the citizen’s jail-
term value is greater than zero it will change the citizens color to black. A non-active 
citizen will be colored a shade of green based on their grievance level. 
to display-agent 
  ifelse visualization = "2D"         ; Reads the chooser button 
     [ display-agent-2D ]                    ; If the dropdown is listed as 2D it runs this 
procedure 
     [ display-agent-3D ]                    ; If it is false it runs the 3D procedure 
    end 
to display-agent-2D  ;; agent procedure 
  set shape "circle" 
  ifelse active? 
     [ set color red ] 
     [ ifelse jailterm > 0 
         [ set color black + 3 ] 
         [ set color scale-color green grievance 1.5 -0.5 ] ] 




ODD Protocol: Initial Conditions: What are the Constant Variables for all Model Runs? 
 
All model runs utilize the same values to exogenous variables with the exception of 
measures of utility and utility growth. The number of citizens is set to 762 with 54 cops 
in the system. The cop’s vision is set to 7. The rebellion threshold is set to 0.20, while 
government legitimacy is set to 0.70. The maximum jail-term is set to 15 turns. The first 
set of model runs are designed to test the effect that differences in mean utility and its 
distribution have on the outbreak of violence. The values for citizen utility are normally 
distributed about different means and standard deviations.  Values for mean utility range 
between 0.9 and 0.1, while measures of standard deviation that are tested include values 
of 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, and 0.2.  
          
 
where: 
                                           
                          
 
The second set of model runs are designed to capture the effects of changing utility over 
time. While the static models explicitly tested the effect of changes to utility mean and  
distribution on rebellion,  dynamic model runs are designed to explore how changes in 
utility over time affect the frequency and magnitude of rebellion.    
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The results of each model variation are discussed at length in chapter 4 & 5. Chapter 4 
lays out the key findings of the static model that allows for changes to the mean and 
distribution of the utility level within the model. Chapter 5 discusses how changes to 
utility with changes over time affect the frequency, magnitude, and speed of onset for 
rebellion. Both models demonstrate that changes to the average level of utility and  its 
distribution have demonstrable effects to the system affecting the onset, duration, and 




Chapter 4: The No Growth Model of Utility  
“Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal and equals that they may be 
superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions.” 
-Aristotle 
 
This chapter discusses the findings of the first model which specifically explores how 
different average utility and distributions effect emergent behavior in a system of agents. 
Changes to both have significant impacts on agents in the system leading us to identify 
five key findings. The first three findings conclude that utility affects the magnitude, 
frequency onset of protest. Next, inequality between citizens in our system has a complex 
relationship with the outbreak of protest demonstrating a direct relationship between 
inequality and protest in high utility environments, while exhibiting a indirect 
relationship in lower utility environments. Lastly, regardless of the utility level, the 
percentage of lower utility citizens maintains a direct relationship with system instability.   
This chapter is broadly structured to first run a baseline model of the original Brookings 
simulation using the same exogenous variables that will be used in the modified model 
and then compare the results with runs of the revised model.  
 
Baseline: The original Brookings “Rebellion” Model 
 
Prior to running the modified Brookings “Rebellion” models, an instance of the original 
model was run to create a baseline from which to compare. The exogenous variables for 





. Given that the original model does not allow for changes in mean 
hardship (Hardship = 0.5) or to its distribution (uniform distribution) a single variation of 
the model is run.  
 
Figure 2: Snapshot of Brookings Model  
 
Figure 2 represents a specific iteration of the Brookings model with non-active citizens 
(green circles), active or protesting citizens (red circles), jailed citizens (dark grey 
circles), and cops (blue triangles) . As we can see from this iteration of the model there 
are a number of active (protesting) citizens in the system with cops moving to arrest and 
impose a jail-term removing them from other citizen’s view for a period of time between 
0 and the maximum jail-term set in the model (15 iterations in this particular scenario).  
Figure 3 shows the number of active citizens in the system over time providing, a longer 
look at the equillibrum reached in the system. For the given set of exogenous variables 
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 For details on the setup of the models please see Chapter 3 on model methodology. 
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defined in the model, the citizens revolt
7
 with an average active citizen level of 
approximately 160 citizens and a peak protest spike of over 600 citizens. There is an 
initial spike in active citizens, followed by a steep decline towards the equillibrium 
protester level. The spike at the start of the simulation is typical for ABM models when 
they start. In this case the intial conditions for citizens produce a larger spike in protest, 
but as citizens move, the system reaches its equillibrium. While the initial spike is not in 
line with the long-run equillibrium, it does not dramatically affect our long-run average 
of a constant state of protest of roughly 160 citizens.    
 
Figure 3: Active Citizen Count in Brookings Model   
 
This model does not allow for changes to the level of hardship, nor to its distribution. The 
Brookings model uses a uniform distribution for the hardship variable. This approach 
effectively fixes this variable as 0.5 in the model. In order to explore more thoroughly the 
dynamics of utility level, distribution, and of time it is necessary to modify the original 
model and run a series of simulations.   
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 Based on our definition, a revolt is a situation in which protestors are never fully controlled by the cops. 
The inability to control protesters in the system leads to our characterization as a system in revolt. Chapter 




The No Growth Model of Utility 
 
In order to explore the dynamics of changes to mean utility and its distribution
8
 on 
decisions by citizens to rebel, it is necessary to make changes to portions of the initial 
model. Details on justification and specification are in chapter 3 of this dissertation. The 
first variation leveraging the changes to the original Brookings model was to run an 
alternative to the model with a mean utility of 0.5 and a standard deviation of zero. 
 
Figure 4: Modified Brookings Model Run with Mean Utility of 0.5 and Std Dev of 0 
 
This model run is done to test an alternative to the uniform distribution of the original 
Brookings model with another, albeit extreme example, where all citizens have the same 
utility.  This exercise serves two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that changing the 
distribution of the utility variable has a verifiable change to the behavior of citizens in the 
model and therefore highlights the value of changes to the original Brookings model. In 
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 Here I mean distribution as a dispersion or variance in the utility among agents. 
66 
 
the Brookings model, we generate revolt with an average protester count of 225 (Figure 
3), however, in the modified model where all citizens have a utility of 0.5, no citizens are 
active in over 2000 iterations of the model (Figure 5). Moving from a continuous protest 
of citizens with a peak count of over 600, to a model run where not a single citizen is 
active in over 2000 iterations clearly demonstrates the importance of the utility variance 
on an citizens decision to become active (e.g. protest). The second purpose for running 
this model variant is to provide a lower bound to our changes of utility variance.  This 
generates a natural set of experiments in which we can examine the role of mean utility, 
and its variance on the decision of citizens to rebel. 
 
Figure 5 Count of Active Citizens with Mean Utility of 0.5 and Std Dev of 0 
 
The set of experiments of the first version of the revised “Rebellion” model, which is 
termed the No Growth Model of Utility, includes over 50 simulations each run with over 
2000 iterations. Simulation with values of mean utility between 0.9 and 0.1 coupled with 
varying distributions
9
 (standard deviation of 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, and 0.20) produced 
divergent results from the Brookings model. Analysis of the results generated five key 
findings.  While the nature of computational modeling is such that each run will provide 
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closely related but marginally different results, the data presented provides representative 
model runs that demonstrate the larger trends that emerge from the experiments. 
Regardless of the individual sample run, the emergent phenomenon is the same. 
Finding 1: Lower levels of average utility are correlated with higher magnitude protests, 
regardless of utility distribution.  
Simulations with lower levels of starting utility, holding distribution constant, 
demonstrated increasing numbers of both peak and average protesters across 50 variants 
of the model. Tables 1 & 2 provide data on the peak and average numbers of protesters 
generated in the model variants. Each table illustrates how lowering average utility from 
0.9 to 0.1 corresponds with increases in the number of protesters generated in the 
simulation regardless of the starting variance.  For example with a starting mean of 0.9 
and a standard deviation of 0.15, we find that peak rebellion increases from 0 active 
citizens to over 630 as we slide starting utility to 0.1. Likewise, the average level of 
active citizens in the simulation increase from 0 to 340 as we move from 0.9 to 0.1 mean 
utility.   There appears to be a hard threshold at utility level 0.33 and standard deviation 0 
for which the system moves from complete stability (e.g no protesting) to large scale 
protest.  This implies that the population of agents below this threshold directly affects 








 Peak Number of Citizens During Protest 
                             Standard Deviation 
  
 









0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.7 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0.6 0 0 0 0 1 2 
0.5 0 0 0 1 5 17 
0.4 0 0 4 21 60 169 
0.35 0 1 182 248 247 247 
0.3 682 668 472 382 345 356 
0.2 648 644 646 594 487 434 
0.1 667 667 673 649 630 580 
Table 1: Peak Number of Active Citizens during Protest 
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In practical terms this result demonstrates that as we lower the utility level, the 
calculation for grievance [(1-U)*(1-L)] increases on average for all citizens, thereby 
increasing the number of citizens in the simulation that are approaching the threshold for 
protest.  This experiment is akin to increasing the deprivation of citizens as we maintain 
the same utility distribution amongst citizens. Lower levels of utility are tied with 
increasing magnitudes of protest. This is not surprising in that it is discernible from the 
citizen rules. 
 Average Number of Protesters 
                  Standard Deviation 
  
 

















0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.5 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0.4 0 0 2 2 4 14 
0.35 0 1 30 56 51 43 
0.3 375 383 195 115 77 95 
0.2 386 382 382 318 232 169 
0.1 386 382 382 377 340 294 






Finding 2: Lower levels of utility are associated with higher frequency of protests, 
regardless of the distribution. 
The simulation produces increased levels of protest as the level of average utility 
declines. As we see in Table 3, regardless of the starting variance, we see increasing 
frequency of punctuated protest in the model as we move from model variants with high 
average utility (0.9-0.6) to lower levels (0.3-0.1).  
Table 3: Frequency of Protest (Percentage of Model Iterations Citizens Protesting) 
 
 Frequency of Protest 
     Standard Deviation 


















0.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0.7 0% 0% 0% 0%  0%   0%  
0.6 0% 0% 0% 0%  0%  0%  
0.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 11% 
0.4 0% 0% 1% 7% 14% 34% 
0.35 0% 0% 13% 36% 30% 33% 
0.3 100% 100% 99% 57% 65% 64% 
0.2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
0.1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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As we move closer to the threshold value (T) for protest, greater numbers of citizens 
begin to protest until the punctuated equilibrium of outbursts devolves into sustained 
revolt. Similar to the first finding, this result is not entirely surprising given that higher 
grieved citizens are more likely to be prone to either start or join an ongoing protest 
thereby increasing the chances of an outburst of activity. The two previous findings 
characterized the impact to both the magnitude and the frequency of protest by citizens in 
the model.  Findings 3, 4, and 5 explore the impact of distribution in the no growth utility 
variability model.   




 of utility among citizens is increased, the onset of protest occurs at 
higher levels of average utility. Tables 1& 2 demonstrate this finding. For a mean utility 
level of 0.5 and standard deviation of .01, there are no active citizens in the model. As we 
move horizontally across both tables, we note the emergence of active citizens in the 
model.  Increasing the distribution of utility appears tied to the emergence of protest at 
higher levels of utility as compared to cases where the distribution is narrow.  
At the most basic level, as the distribution of utility widens, more citizens with lower 
utility are present in the model.  The citizens with lower utility are then prone to protest 
when either their net risk calculus changes (as security forces move) or other citizens 
protest within their vision.  Moving between extremes, we can see this quite clearly. In a 
model variant that has an average utility of 0.5 and a standard deviation of zero, we do 
not record any active citizens over 2000 iterations of the model. If we define low utility 
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 The term distribution is referring specifically to the size of the variance or the standard deviation.   
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citizens as ones with utility levels of 0.25 and below, we would have no low utility 
citizens in the model, when the standard deviation is zero. As we move from a standard 
deviation of zero to 0.2 however, the peak protester count moves from  0 to 17.  Again, in 
practical terms this means that although the mean utility for all citizens remains 0.5, some 
citizens in the model have utility levels well below this value, thereby creating some low 
utility citizens each that have higher levels of grievance. These more aggrieved citizens 
are then more sensitive to the spatial interplay between security forces (cops) in their 
field of vision as well as to the activity of others around them. Finally, if we move to the 
results of the original Brookings model with a uniform distribution, we see peak number 
of rebels swell to over 600. The much wider uniform distribution dramatically increases 
the number of more aggrieved citizens in the lattice, thereby increasing the number of 
citizens more likely to rebel even as average utility remains high.    
Finding 4: In high average utility models, higher variance increases magnitude 
and frequency of protest; a lower utility model with higher variance lowers 
magnitude and frequency of protest.  
The relationship between utility variance and its effect on the magnitude and frequency 
of violence is the most interesting and surprising result of the No Growth model. The 
result from the data imply a bifurcated result. In models that have higher levels of 
average utility, magnitude and frequency of protest grow as we increase the variance of 
utility (e.g higher standard deviation about the mean); however, in lower average utility 
models higher variance is associated with smaller and less frequent protest.  In other 
words, as we increase the inequality between agents in better off societies social 
instability grows. However in societies that are worse off and that are below a threshold 
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for protest, increasing inequality reduces protest in the society. This result is surprising as 
it implies that increasing utility variance, or inequality of utility between citizens, is not 
always associated with higher and more frequent levels of protest. If in fact distributional 
affects of utility are bifurcated, then empirical tests of measures inequality such as a gini 
coefficient on the outbreak of civil violence are obfuscated. This result demonstrates that 
other measures of inequality will be better testable variables in empirical testing. 
The distributional affects on rebellion in the model are demonstrated in Figures 6 & 7. In 
Figure 6 mean utility levels of 0.5, 0.4, and 0.35 are correlated with higher peak protester 
counts than with cases of more narrow distribution.  However, in lower average utility 
levels of 0.2 and 0.3 this relationship flips, with smaller distributions correlated with 





Figure 6: Distribution Changes and Protest 
 
We can see this relationship switch in citizen behavior more clearly in Figure 7. With 
higher levels of mean utility, protester counts remain low across all distributions as the 
grievance amongst citizens is not enough to trigger the “active” rule
11
. As we move to 
lower levels of utility, however the distributional effects on utility begin to emerge. In the 
initial setup, higher levels of utility distribution generate larger numbers of low utility 
citizens who are dispersed within the lattice. These citizens are more sensitive to 
movements of security forces and create more pools of unrest once a protest begins. 
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Figure 7: Variance, Mean Utility and Protest  
 
At a mean utility level of 0.4, the higher distribution of 0.2 generates close to 200 active 
citizens at the peak, yet the low distributions of .01 and .05 do not see any citizens 
protesting. As we move to a mean utility of 0.2, the higher distributions exhibit a lower 
level of peak rebels whereas the lower distributions now see higher levels of intense 
protest. In a similar manner in which the higher distribution of utility generated higher 
levels of utility poor citizens, the higher distribution at lower levels of mean utility create 
more utility rich citizens. This serves to help create islands of stability or instability that 
can either to serve to destabilize or stabilize the system. In a model with a mean utility of 
0.5 and a standard deviation of 0, all citizens have the same level of utility and are 




























all citizens showing the same gradation of green. However, as we open the aperture of 
utility distribution we begin to see higher levels of grievance amongst some citizens. 
Figure 9 demonstrates this with more highly aggrieved citizens a lighter shade of green. 
These lighter shaded citizens represent islands of instability.  
 
        Figure 8: Mean Utility 0.5 Std Dev 0 
 
      Figure 9: Mean Utility 0.5 Std Dev .2 
In both cases, the reduction of mean utility will push citizens towards protest, however in 
cases with larger utility distributions some citizens in the lattice will rebel at higher levels 
of mean utility.  Conversely, the instability introduced by larger distributions are flipped 
at lower levels of utility as more high utility citizens create islands of stability serving to 
reduce the intensity and frequency of protest. 
We observe a similar bifurcated result in analyzing the frequency of protest. In figure 10, 
we find a similar structure as in figure 7 where with higher mean utility, the frequency of 





Figure 10: Distribution Effects: Frequency, Mean Utility & Protest  
 
While the frequency of protest continues to increase as we lower the mean utility level, it 
is surpassed by model variants that have a lower initial variance. It appears that the 
variance of utility affects the functional form to the growth of magnitude and frequency 
of protest. In models with high distributions, the growth both in the magnitude and the 
frequency of rebellion is more linear, where in standard deviations that are smaller (e.g 
0.01 or 0.05) the growth becomes exponential. This particular result should be of broad 
interest to the research community, as inequality measures have not been linked to 
increase likelihood of civil conflict.  This result implies that distributional effects of 
individual well-being are more complicated than has been discussed in the conflict 
literature.   If in fact a bifurcated relationship exists, then the results of a model that 
assumes a direct relationship mispecifies the true relationship. This could generate results 



































The central problem with past approaches in testing for the effect of inequality and 
conflict revolves around how we think about conditions for individuals.  In the simplest 
terms, proponents of the argument that inequality is a determinant for civil conflict 
contend that as utility or income become more divergent in a society, the grievance level 
amongst individuals grows significantly. Conversely, more equal outcomes amongst 
individuals are less likely to provoke these interpersonal conflicts thereby removing 
motivation for larger scale violence. It is possible to imagine a situation however, when 
greater distribution of utility might in fact be more stabilizing? In a extreme case where 
all individuals have the same utility or income, but that level is below a minimum amount 
acceptable by the population you are likely to see protests.  All individuals are equally 
starving. In this case you would have a perfectly equitable society with a gini coefficient 
of 0, but still likely to see violence from a desperate starving mob. A greater distribution 
however, would place some individuals above the minimum level reducing motivation by 
those individuals to protest. If the distribution were great enough a larger group of elites 
who have no stake in participating in violent protest would remain as islands of stability.  
While this result is interesting it does not capture all of the possible dynamics in the 
society. This model does not allow for citizens to compare their situation with others. 
There is no representation of horizontal equity which would likely affect the outcome of 
protest. This finding is specifically aimed at understanding how individual deprivation 
alone might affect decisions to protest.  
The lack of statistical correlation remains a significant barrier in our understanding the 
relationship between inequality and determinants of civil conflict. The example discussed 
above illustrates a central problem with using a gini coefficient alone as a measure of 
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inequality in empirical modeling. If in fact a gini coefficient is used, then a specification 
for higher and lower income countries would need to be added to account for the 
bifurcated nature of distribution of utility on protest levels.  To date this has not been 
done, with researchers primarily testing for a direct relationship between the gini 
coefficient and the outbreak of civil conflict.  All find that the measure is neither 
statistically significant nor of a value of any consequence.  Sambanis in particular has 
argued that the problems with model specification and data quality have made the testing 
of inequality difficult.     The no growth model’s findings explain why empirical testing 
of gini coefficients alone might not be the right variable of choice.  
To this point, I have discussed the effects of changes to the average level of utility and its 
distribution on the level and frequency of rebellion. The fourth finding highlighted one of 
the challenges with looking at distribution measures alone as a predictable determinant of 
citizen activity. The bifurcated result highlights the challenge of analyzing measures of 
income inequality and its relationship with civil conflict.  
 
Finding 5: Lower utility citizens are associated with higher instability. 
In the previous finding, I showed that using a direct measure of utility variance is not as 
straightforward as the empirical literature suggests.  While it is possible to utilize a 
measure like a gini coefficient, it is necessary to correct for high or low utility cases to 
determine the sign of the correlation. Leaving this problem aside, is there a better 
measure for the problem of variance in utility? In the modified model, I find that in all 
cases increased numbers of low utility citizens, defined as having utility lower than 0.34, 
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are correlated with greater levels of protest. The model runs show that as you increase the 
number of low utility citizens a system, regardless of the variance of utility, the system 
becomes more unstable. Unlike a measure of inequality such as a gini coefficient, the 
number of low utility citizens appears to be a better measure for the effect of utility 
variance on protest.  In the sample runs of the model where variance is fixed at zero (e.g 
all citizens have exactly the same utility), there is a point at which all citizens will move 
from being quiet to protesting. This threshold is 0.33 utility and is how I define citizens 
with low utility. When utility for all citizens moves from 0.34 to 0.33 the system moves 
from being completely quiet to extreme protest.  
The relationship between the low utility rate and protest is quickly observed in the two 
figures below.  Figure 11 represents a higher utility case showing average rebellion 
increasing in the model as the number of low utility citizens in the model increases. 
  








































Low Utility Rate and Protest  
(Mean Utility 0.4) 














































Low Utility Rate and Protest  
(Mean Utility 0.35) 









The figures above demonstrate that with a widening variance (standard deviation) in 
utility among citizens, the population with utility below the threshold 0.33 helps generate 
the increasing instability of the model. Simply stated the variance increases the number of 
citizens protesting.    
Likewise, in Figure 12, we also see a direct relationship, but this time we are on the other 
side of the threshold of 0.34 so as the low utility population falls we see a corresponding 
decrease in average protest. Low utility’s relationship with protest appears to hold in both 
higher and lower cases.  
 
     
Figure 12: Low Utility and Average Protest, Low Utility Cases 
 
Moving beyond our simple figures for high and low utility cases this relationship broadly 






































Low Utility Rate and Protest  
(Mean Utility 0.1) 












































Low Utility Rate and Protest  
(Mean Utility 0.2) 









with two trends seen. First, not surprisingly, as we lower the average level of utility, 
regardless of the distribution, we see corresponding increases in the low utility rate.  
Second, the data highlights an interesting condition as we change the variance. We find 
that in higher utility level models (0.9 through 0.35), higher variance leads to higher low 
utility rates among citizens. This is consistent with how we casually think about measures 
of inequality, but this is really only one perspective. In low utility cases such as mean 
utility levels of 0.2 or 0.3, we see that increased distribution lowers the population of 
citizens with low utility. Simply stated as you increase variance about the mean you will 
see more citizens with values above the level we have defined as low utility (e.g less than 
0.34). Histograms of these cases can be found in the appendix demonstrating the 












Table 4: Low Utility Rates for the Model 
 
Low Utility Rate (<.34 Utility) 
      Standard Deviation 
    
 























0.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
0.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 
0.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 10% 
0.5 0% 0% 0% 6% 16% 21% 
0.4 0% 0% 12% 32% 35% 39% 
0.35 0% 18% 43% 45% 48% 51% 
0.3 100% 100% 78% 70% 61% 61% 
0.2 100% 100% 100% 93% 81% 75% 
0.1 100% 100% 100% 99% 94% 89% 
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A simple comparison of the low utility rate with the average level of protesters in the 
model in Table 5 demonstrates a direct relationship between the number of low utility 
citizens and the number of protesters.  
Table 5: Average Number of Protesters  
This relationship is interesting in that it shows that growing populations below a 
threshold can generate instability in a system of citizens. While we might be tempted to 
think of this as a simple poverty measure, the threshold is not tied to some absolute 
definition of poverty. It is easy to imagine a society where all of the necessities of life are 
met, but as conditions worsen beyond some acceptable level, social instability ensues. 
Examples of this are the protests over austerity in Spain and Greece in 2012-2013. Both 
Average Number of Protesters  
                 Standard Deviation 
  
 









0.9 0 0 0 0 0 
0.8 0 0 0 0 0 
0.7 0 0 0 0 0 
0.6 0 0 0 0 0 
0.5 0 0 0 1 1 
0.4 0 2 2 4 14 
0.35 1 30 56 51 43 
0.3 383 195 115 77 95 
0.2 382 382 318 232 169 
0.1 382 382 377 340 294 
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countries are relatively wealthy as compared with others, with their citizens enjoying a 
much higher standing of living, however mass protests ensue when the government 
announced large cuts to state employment and some social programs
12
. A growing 
population who’s actual or perceived utility declines below an acceptable threshold 
generates the potential for social instability. 
The direct relationship between the population of citizens below the threshold of 0.34 and 
the increasing level of protest is demonstrated in the Figure 13. In this graph, I have 
plotted for the utility levels 0.4, 0.35, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.1 and their corresponding variances, 
the number of protesters active in the system versus the number of low utility citizens. 
What we find is that as we increase the number of low utility citizens the number of 
protesters increases. This represents a key finding in the model.  


























Low Utility Citizens 
Low Utility Citizens and Number of Protesters 
Mean 0.1 (All Std Dev) 
Mean 0.2 (All Std Dev) 
Mean 0.30 (All Std Dev) 
Mean 0.35 (All Std Dev) 
Mean 0.4 (All Std Dev) 
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Chapter 5: Results - The Growth Utility Model  
 
"…revolt is a thing of the stomach." 
-Hugo, Victor 
 
In the previous chapter, I covered how simple changes to the Brookings Model resulted 
in different outcomes as the mean utility level and its distribution amongst citizens is 
changed. What the previous iteration of the model did not address however, was how 
citizen behavior changed as utility levels fluctuate over time. Are there discernible 
changes in our model as we allow changes to mean utility over time? If so, what are the 
behaviors and emerging phenomenon in this system? In this chapter, I discuss the 
evolution of citizen behavior in models where utility is allowed to change. I find that the 
magnitude, frequency, onset, and evolution of protest to revolt are affected by the level 
and distribution of utility. While some results such as declining utility for citizens are 
associated with protest over time are to be predicted, the dynamics of that change are 
unique to the research presented in this paper. In total, I discuss nine central findings in 
this chapter. These include:   
 Increasing average utility over time leads to quelling of continuous revolt 
followed by periods of punctuated protest; 
 Increasing average utility over time associated with lower numbers of protesters 
in continuous revolt; 




 During continuous revolt, increasing the utility distribution affects the rate of 
change of active citizens in the system; 
 Higher utility distribution associated with higher magnitude and frequency of 
punctuated revolt in systems with increasing levels of average utility; 
 Higher utility distributions have punctuated protests that take longer to quell; 
 Decreasing average utility over time leads to punctuated protest followed by the 
outbreak of continuous revolt; 
 Decreasing average utility associated with higher magnitude and frequency of   
protest; and 
 Higher initial utility variance leads to earlier punctuated protest; 
 
This chapter expands our investigation into utility and its distribution by introducing two 
different models focused on intertemporal change to utility. The first model, or the 
“Utility Growth Model”, is a set of model runs that take a low average utility system and 
grow it by specific utility intervals. This provides us insight into transitions in a system as 
we move from a period of continuous protest (e.g. revolt) due to low levels of average 
utility to a environment that becomes more stable. In the second model, the “Negative 
Utility Growth Model”, we reduce utility from a higher average level. This allows us to 
explore the problem of citizen behavior as the model transitions from relatively stable 
conditions to an environment more prone to protest. Both scenarios are important  in 
understanding how mean utility, distribution, and incremental change matter to citizen 
behavior and highlight findings that serve to help us understand empirical results by 
researchers obtained over the past decade.       
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The Growth Utility Model: Growth of Utility and the Effect on Political Protest 
 
The growth utility model moves beyond our previous model by expanding our 
investigation of distribution to include changes to utility over time. By introducing 
change in utility, we are able to explore citizen behavioral change outside of the 
equilibrium reached in the no growth model.  Specifically the addition of time allows us 
to explore the relationship between changes in mean utility, its distribution amongst 
citizens, and the trade-off between selection and peer effects in the model.  
In the first set of model variations, I construct a system starting from a lower level of 
utility at varying levels of distribution and increase utility incrementally.  I start each 
model run with a low average utility level of 0.2 and grown it at a regular interval of 
0.0001 utiles per iteration.  The starting distributions run in these models are: 0.01, 0.05, 
0.10, 0.15, and 0.20. There is no variation in growth
13
 introduced in this simulation, 
which serves to maintain the initial distribution throughout the period of growth to the 
model.   
 
Finding 1: Increasing average utility over time leads to quelling of revolt followed 
by periods of punctuated protest. 
 
The first finding in the growth utility model concerns a basic observation across all 
distributions. Over time each system, which begins in equilibrium of revolt, eventually 
sees that activity quelled only to be followed by periods of punctuated protest. Figures 14 
                                                     
13
 Allowing variation in utility growth is an important topic that needs to be explored and is highlighted in 
the conclusion of this paper as an area for future research. 
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& 15 demonstrate this result. As we find at the start of each model run, the number of 
citizens that are active (e.g. revolt) never reach zero. This condition is a state of revolt in 
the model. Over time as the level of utility is increased, we find that the number of active 
citizens declines. At some point in each model variation, the number of active citizens 
collapses to zero, quelling the revolt. 
 
We find that once rebellion revolt is quelled it is followed by a short period of protest. 
The size, frequency, and duration of that protest is correlated to the distribution of utility 
in the model. Over time, as utility is added, the size and frequency of protest is reduced. 
The amount of utility required to quiet all citizens however is also correlated with the 
distribution of utility in the system.  A more detailed discussion of the characteristics of 
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protest is found later in this chapter, however it is enough right now to highlight the 
general characteristic of revolt followed by periods of protest.  
  
Figure 15: Utility, Revolt, and Protest in Higher Distribution Systems 
 
 
Finding 2: Increasing average utility over time associated with lower numbers of 
rebels in revolt 
 
As we grow the system from a starting average utility level of 0.2 to higher levels, the 
average number of rebels in revolt falls. This result is independent of the starting 
distribution and is a direct result of increasing utility that lowers grievance levels. While 
a simple comparative analysis amongst differing distributions highlights the differences 
of active citizen counts between models, it is true that all models reflect a decline in 
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active citizen levels over time as utility increases by a rate of 0.0001 utiles per iteration 
for each level of distribution tested.  For purposes of this discussion, I have not included 
citizen counts from punctuated protest after the revolt is quelled.  
  
Figure 16: Revolt Over Time 
 
At the micro level, citizens in the system see their utility levels increase over time. This 
reduces grievance to levels where some citizens, depending on the initial distribution, 
find their grievance level below the threshold of becoming active. Once below the 
threshold (T), some citizens go quiet. This reduces the overall average of citizens active 
in the system, yet is not enough to quell the outbreak of activity. Over time however, 
regardless of the distribution, the active citizen count is lowered to where it reaches a 
tipping point (around 100 citizens protesting or 13% of the total population) resulting in 


































































Iteration of the Model (Time) 
Revolt Over Time 
Starting Utility of 0.2, Growth of .0001 per Iteration  
Std Dev .01 
Std Dev .05 
Std Dev .1 
Std Dev .15 
Std Dev .2 
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point introduces a dynamic of punctuated protest with magnitudes and frequency closely 
tied with utility distribution. This result is addressed in more detail later in the chapter. 
 
Finding 3: Higher initial utility distributions associated with lower number of 
citizens in revolt.  
 
In low utility environments, greater levels of utility variance between citizens lead to 
greater stability.  Similar to finding four in the last chapter, we see that in a low average 
utility environment, a higher distribution results in a lower level of active citizens.  All 
model variations exhibit the presence of citizen revolt, but the average number of active 
citizens is higher in cases of lower distribution.  Table 6 provides a representative run of 
this phenomenon. In this table as we move to higher levels of distribution, we find 
increasing levels of active citizens in the system. While lower levels of distribution don’t 
see pronounced differences, the larger the difference in distribution the greater the impact 














Table 6: Starting Levels of Active Citizens by Utility Distribution 
 
For example, a utility distribution of 0.20 exhibits 84% fewer active citizens as compared 
with a distribution of zero. This relationship holds as utility changes as the structural 
difference introduced at the start is maintained, although the size of that difference does 
change. In Table 7, we see this result with large differences in active citizen counts as we 














at Interval 1000 
 
Active Citizens at 
Interval 2000 
 
0 383 374 386 
0.01 375 375 375 
0.05 373 359 228 
0.10 325 228 138 
0.15 241 205 * 
0.20 208 146 * 
Table 7: Distribution and Active Citizens Model Iterations 100, 1000, 2000 
*Revolt Quelled 
 
The increased level of distribution means that there are more utility rich citizens that do 
not become active unless their perception of political illegitimacy or their net risk causes 
them to protest. This behavior at the citizen level helps create more variability in citizen 
decisions leading to lower levels of active citizens. Over time as utility reaches a certain 
level, these large distributions disrupt the system leading to a collapse of continuous 
active citizens and ushering in a period of punctuated protest.  Conversely, with lower 
distributions of utility there are not as many individuals whose grievance is sufficiently 
low to buttress against the behavior of other active citizens. Therefore, the revolt level 
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remains persistently high even as average utility climbs higher. With citizens more or less 
homogenous in their utility, the peer effect of constant revolt reinforces the stability of 
that equilibrium. However, as we will see later, the same dynamic that serves to sustain a 
persistently high rebellion in low utility models, serves to lower the level of punctuated 
protest after revolt is quelled. 
This result presents a situation in which greater equality among citizens leads to higher 
levels of revolt in low utility models.  This result implies a counterintuitive proposition; 
greater inequality leads to less protest. Does this make practical sense though? In a case 
where there is perfect equality in a society, but all persons are starving it would be 
entirely plausible to see starving mobs taking to the streets to either protest or to riot for 
food.  If we accept this premise then this result implies a more complicated (e.g exhibits 
both a direct and indirect relationship) problem for empirical tests that attempt to link 
inequality and stability. In fact, the empirical literature that seeks to explore the 
relationship between measures of inequality and conflict do not account for this problem. 
It is likely that the non-significance or directionality problem they encounter is a result of 
the phenomenon identified in this model. 
 Similar to our finding in the previous chapter, our result in the growth utility model 
reinforces the conclusion that a direct measure of inequality is difficult to use as a 
predictor of civil conflict. The challenge for researchers is to understand when the 
directionality of the relationship flips.  This is directly related to the average level of 
utility as well as the distribution. However, understanding an individual’s threshold for 
protest is extremely difficult. It seems that a more direct measure such as the number of 
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low utility citizens is a better as the correlation between low utility and conflict is 
maintained in both high and low utility environments. 
 
Finding 4:  During citizen revolt, increasing the utility distribution affects the rate 
of change of active citizens in the system.  
 
The previous result found that the distribution of utility affected the number of active 
citizens observed in a state of revolt. While that result is stable as we increase utility over 
time, we also observe that the rate of decline in active citizen counts changes with utility 
distribution. As we see in Figure 16, the rate by which active citizens decline differs as 
we change the distribution of utility. The figure highlights differing functional forms for 
each model run as we move from exponential declines in active citizen counts when we 
have small distributions to a linear rate of decline with larger distributions of utility. 
 In the low distribution model with a standard deviation of  0.01 we find that the number 
of active citizens is relatively stable even as average utility climbs higher. However, in a 
sample run there is a quick decline of active citizens starting around the 2200
th
 iteration 
of the model. The precipitous decline follows a non-linear form with active citizens 
declining from 371 active citizens at the 2200
th
 iteration to 0  by the 2609
th
 iteration in the 
representative model run.   This represents only .04 additional utility added to each 
citizen to move the system from its’ long-term equilibrium of around 370 active citizens 
to zero.  
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Conversely, in models with larger distributions we find that active citizens decline 
immediately and at a linear rate, until the ultimate collapse of the revolt.    In the sample 
run of the model with a 0.20 standard deviation we find that the count of active citizens 
moves from its starting count of roughly 210 and reach zero by the 1434
th
 iteration. 
While the general trend of this decline is linear, the final 100 active citizens around 
iteration 1434 do collapse in a non-linear fashion.    
The rate of decline of active citizens is a function of the variance of citizen utility. When 
citizens are relatively more homogenous in their utility (e.g small distribution/variance), 
they exhibit larger active citizen counts and require large increases to average utility to 
suppress revolt. However, when citizen counts decline, they collapse quickly. 
Alternatively, in larger distributions, smaller levels of utility are required to move active 
citizen counts lower. Each of these cases demonstrates that the distribution of the utility 
is as important as the level itself in supporting levels of active citizens. 
To this point, we have discussed the characteristics of revolt we find in the Utility 
Growth Model. We have discussed how the distribution of utility affects frequency, 
magnitude, and the rate of change in active citizens during a period of revolt. The next 
several findings discuss the characteristics of punctuated protest that we find emerges 
after the revolt is quelled.   
Finding 5: Higher utility distribution is associated with higher magnitude and 
frequency of protest  
We notice that our models begin to develop levels of punctuated activity after a revolt is 
quelled. The punctuated protests are discernible by the large spikes of active citizens 
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emerging in the system, but are then suppressed by security forces. This phenomenon is 
detailed in Epstein, Steinbruner, and Parker’s original paper and is a signature in ABM 
modeling.  
For our purposes, the punctuated protest is interesting in that the magnitude and 
frequency of it is tied to the distribution of the citizens’ utility level. We see in figure 17 
evidence for this finding. In our model run where the utility distribution is 0.01 standard 
deviation we see that once revolt is quelled around the 2500 iteration in the model, 
punctuated protest is observed. The count of active citizens is just over 220, before the 
cops in the model are able to suppress the outbreak of protest.  There are only a handful 
of outbreaks of protest before the system becomes relatively peaceful with active citizen 
counts becoming zero for the rest of the simulation.   
On the other hand, models with larger distributions have different observables. In our 
case with a utility distribution of 0.20 standard deviations, we see multiple outbreaks of 
punctuated protest with a initial active citizen count of almost 400. The magnitude of the 
punctuated protest declines over time as the average level of utility for the citizens is 




Figure 17: Increasing Utility and Protest 
 
The higher magnitude and increased frequency of punctuated protest in larger distribution 
models is particularly interesting in that the magnitude of active citizens during periods 
of punctuated protest is higher than during the periods where revolt was observed. As can 
be seen in figure 17, for almost 1700 iterations in the model, the active citizen counts 
during punctuated protest exceed 200, the initial level of rebels during the period of 
revolt.  
Finding 6: Higher utility distributions have punctuated protests that take longer to 
quell  
In addition to differences in the magnitude and frequency of protest, we find that higher 
distributions of utility amongst citizens lead to longer periods of punctuated protest. 
Again, figure 17 serves to highlight this finding. As we observe, the level of citizen 
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punctuated protest through over 3900 iterations of  the model, whereas in our other model 
we see that it subsides before the 2800
th
 iteration. Recalling that in our earlier findings 
where distribution helped to stabilize a system experiencing revolt, we find the opposite 
holds true during periods of punctuated protest. At the citizen level, the larger distribution 
of utility means that both utility rich and poor citizens exist in mass. In low utility 
scenarios, the higher utility citizens would serve as a more stabilizing force, reducing the 
count of active citizens. However, once the rebellion is quelled, there still exist large 
numbers of utility poor citizens whose grievance remains high. Small changes to their 
risk perception (i.e. as cops move) are enough to change their behavior potentially setting 
off large waves of protest. The larger distribution therefore necessitates more utility for 
all citizens such that a vast majority of our individuals’ grievance is reduced to the point 
where the peer effect of other citizens is minimized.   
 
The Negative Growth Utility Model: Declines in Utility and Protest 
 
We now have a relatively good idea of how our model performs starting from a relatively 
low level of utility as it grows over time. We discussed how the initial equilibrium of 
revolt transforms to a period of punctuated protest and is eventually quelled over time. 
We also identified that the magnitude, frequency, and rate of change to active citizens in 
the model is correlated with both distribution and to the level of utility in the system.  In 
this section of the chapter, I continue to explore the dynamics in the model by beginning 
from a relatively higher level of utility and then decrease it by an interval over time. As 
with our previous experiments, I rerun this simulation at varying values of utility 
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distribution. I conduct this experiment to both replicate results achieved earlier, as well as 
to understand how a system is disrupted from a seemingly stable status.  
The series of experiments run in this section of the chapter I referred to as the Negative 
Utility Growth Model. This model generates three major findings. These findings are: 
1) Decreasing average utility over time leads to punctuated protest followed by the 
outbreak of revolt; 
2)  Decreasing average utility associated with higher magnitude and frequency of   
protest; 
3) Higher initial utility distribution leads to earlier punctuated protest; 
These findings discussed in detail in the chapter are similar in nature with observations in 
the Utility Growth Model. This result is not surprising as the methodology is similar, 
different only in the initial position and the direction of utility growth. However, the 
advantage of testing the model from an alternate direction, allows us to concentrate on 
the emergence of active citizens in a stable system.  This approach helps in the analysis 
of initial instability leading to greater punctuated rebellion followed by the emergence of 
continuous rebellion.   
Finding 1: Decreasing average utility over time leads to punctuated protest 
followed by the outbreak of revolt 
This finding is similar to the first finding of this chapter. The introduction of negative 
utility growth over time introduces three phases to our model.  The first phase is one with 
no active citizens observed. The second phase, marked by punctuated protest, emerges 
with some citizens choosing to protest at greater intensity only to be suppressed by 
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security forces. Finally, punctuated citizen activity gives way to revolt as cops are unable 
to suppress active citizens in the system. The three phases are not homogenous as we do 
see differences in magnitude and frequency as distribution changes; however, the 






























































Citizen Protest and Declining Utility 











Figure 19: Citizen Activity and Declining Utility, Std Dev 0.15 
 
In both figures 18 & 19, we see the transition from stability, to punctuated protest, and 
finally to citizen revolt. The magnitude, frequency and the speed from one phase to the 
next are correlated with changes to the utility distribution (e.g standard deviation of 
utility).  
 
Finding 2: Decreasing average utility associated with higher magnitude of protest  
 
When we reduce utility across all citizens by 0.0001 utiles per model iteration, average 
utility is in turn lowered. As we move from higher average utility levels to lower levels of 
utility, we begin to introduce instability as grievance levels increase among citizens. The 
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frequency of initial punctuated citizen activity, followed by revolt. We see this pattern 
demonstrated in Figure 6, where over time the magnitude and frequency of active citizens 
increases both in punctuated protest and revolt.  More specifically, we see the increasing 
intensity of protest and revolt in declining utility environments in Table 8.  















1-25 100% 89.8% 65.5% 20.9% 0.4% 
26-50 0% 3.9% 4.2% 2.6% 0.0% 
51-75 0% 1.9% 4.0% 2.3% 0.0% 
76-100 0% 2.1% 4.6% 3.1% 0.0% 
101-125 0% 1.1% 4.3% 3.5% 0.0% 
126-150 0% 0.8% 4.0% 2.7% 0.9% 
151-175 0% 0.5% 3.5% 3.5% 12.7% 
176-200 0% 0.0% 3.5% 18.0% 6.3% 
201 + 0% 0.0% 6.3% 43.5% 79.7% 
Table 8: Events by Utility Level 
 
At an average utility level of 0.50, all events are small in scale with 100% of protests 
containing fewer than 25 active citizens in the system. Whereas in a low utility 
environment, more of the events become large scale events (e.g.  79.7% for utility level 
of 0.20). This pattern repeats throughout the data, with low intensity events dominating in 
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high utility environments, and with high intensity violence associated with low utility 
environments.  
Finding 3: Higher initial utility distribution leads to earlier and more frequent 
punctuated protest 
As utility levels are decreased over time, punctuated protest occurs earlier and more 
frequently with higher distribution levels. In figures 20 & 21, we see that an initially 
stable system moves to a period of punctuated protest followed by the emergence of 
citizen revolt.  
 
Figure 20: Citizen Activity as Utility with Distribution of 0.05 Declines over Time 
 
The onset of punctuated protest does differ however as we change distribution of utility 
among citizens.  We can visually check this in the two figures.  Our simulation with a 














































Citizen Activity as Utility Decreases 
Starting Utility 0.6, Declining -.0001 




while in the smaller distribution of 0.05 we do not see this activity until model iteration 
2384.    
 
Figure 21: Citizen Activity as Utility with Distribution of 0.15 Declines over Time 
 
Moving beyond visual analysis, we can see the onset of punctuated protest across all 
tested distributions in table 9. There is a general trend of earlier punctuated protest onset 
as we increase distribution. The one exception to this finding is for a distribution of 0.20. 
In this case, we do see earlier episodes of protest, but the magnitude of the events are 
under the 25 citizen definition. It is interesting that although we do not see the earlier 
onset of larger events, the presence of significant numbers of lower magnitude events 
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Thus far, we have observed that the magnitude of punctuated protest appears correlated 
with the distribution of utility among citizens in our system. However, we also find that 
in addition to the earlier onset of punctuated protest, revolt among citizens also appears 
more frequent in systems with a wider distribution of utility. We observe in Figure 21 
over 14 episodes in a system with a standard deviation of utility of 0.15, whereas in 
Figure 20 we find only four major episodes tied to a distribution of 0.05.   
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we explored the dynamics of the modified Brookings Model as we 
allowed utility to change over time. Change to utility, and thereby hardship, both in its 
level and distribution provided decidedly distinct results from the Brookings model.  The 
magnitude, frequency, and onset of protest and revolt are affected by the distribution of 
utility amongst citizens within the system. The change to activity in three phases of 
Distribution 
Punctuated  Protest  
>25 






0.05 2384 2819 
0.1 2137 3055 
0.15 1604 3167 
0.2 2047 3495 
Table 9: Start of Rebellion by Distribution and Model Iteration 
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citizen behavior, stability, punctuated protest and revolt inform us to how selection and 
peer effects in the model influence the outbreak and sustainability of revolt.  
The results discussed in the chapter have provided insight into possible relationships that 
are observed in empirical data seen in conflict datasets. Specifically the relationship 
between utility levels, their distribution and the impact to protest/revolt frequency, onset, 
and magnitude provide verifiable postulates, which if supported would allow us to better 







Chapter 6: Policy Considerations and Areas for Future 
Research 
“When the fabric of society is so rigid that it cannot change quickly 
 enough, adjustments are achieved by social unrest and revolutions.” 
-John Boyd Orr 
 
Human expression of grievance can evolve from the angst of single individual into a 
broad movement demanding the removal of a central authority. The manner in which 
protest stems from the economic condition of the individual and his peers is the focus of 
the dissertation. The characteristics of a protest, specifically the onset, magnitude, and 
frequency of civil unrest is explored by expanding on the Brookings Model. The results 
of the simulation lay out specific relationships between protest and changes to the 
average level of utility, its distribution, and rate of change of utility in a system of agents.  
This approach is distinctly different from most research in civil conflict as it avoids 
statistical modeling and instead utilizes an agent based computational approach. This 
method allows us to develop a coherent theory of how individual motivation transforms 
into group behavior and allows us to analyze both multi points of equilibrium as well as 
states of disequilibrium. Our results from this effort provide coherent, consistent, and in 
some cases surprising conceptual results that expand our understanding of the dynamics 
of protest. These results suggest that the level and distribution of individual utility play 
important roles in how mass protest emerges and develops in a system of agents. The 
importance of citizen’s economic well-being therefore becomes an important policy 
concern as governments and international agencies evaluate the efficacy of reform 
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programs. While economic interests in the long-term are served by substantial subsidy 
reform or decreases in state supported employment, the short-term consequences to social 
stability are important factors that should be considered.  
Most research into civil conflict and violence has utilized either case study or 
econometric modeling that utilize large datasets to draw inference between variables and 
the outbreak of civil conflict. In the second chapter of this paper, we discussed major 
themes in the field of conflict study of the past several decades. The most recent research 
in the field has focused on the relationship between determinants of political grievance or 
macro-economic condition on the emergence of civil conflict. Some studies suggest 
economic conditions, specifically the amount of primary commodities as a percentage of 
GDP, provide incentive for rebellion to ensue as purely a function of the net benefits 
individuals receive from rebellion. Other supporters of this view, while skeptical of the 
primary commodities argument, look to macroeconomic indicators as a reflection of the 
weakness of central authority to repress any potential uprisings, and not to the 
microeconomic condition of individuals as a motivator for protest against the state. They 
point specifically to measures of national income and economic growth as proxies for the 
relative strength of the central authority and its ability to field security forces large 
enough to deter or quell any potential uprising. Primarily citing statistical correlation 
between income measures and the outbreak of civil conflict, these researchers are largely 
ignoring economic-grievance determinants of emergent violence. While some researchers 
point to the robustness of these independent variables on the onset of civil conflict, the 
lack of detailed local data blunts the ability of statistical analysis to delve deeper into 
possible economic grievance motivators for conflict. Is it possible that the statistical 
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correlations between income, growth and the outbreak of civil conflict are not strictly 
explained as a proxy of government strength or of the benefits of rebellion, but are in fact 
tied to the grievance of individuals who are not able to support themselves or their 
families?   
This dissertation has taken a different approach to the problem of understanding how 
mass protest emerges in society.  Instead of conducting an econometric analysis testing 
independent variables against large datasets of conflict data, agent based modeling 
techniques are utilized to help conceptualize how measures of individual utility relate to 
emergence of mass protest and possible revolt. This effort builds on an earlier framework 
of emergent protest that allows us to explore how changes in the average utility and its 
distribution in a system of adaptive citizens affect an emergent outcome of civil unrest. 
The third chapter details this effort to modify the Brookings Model by focusing in three 
specific areas. First, we can change average level of utility in a system of citizens 
removing the uniform distribution used in the original model. The introduction of a 
normal distribution severs the constraint imposed by a uniform distribution allowing for 
changes to both the mean and standard deviation. Second, the introduction of a 
modifiable standard deviation allowed for testing at various intervals allowing us to 
examine changes in utility variation in the system of citizens. This change lets us 
examine how distributional affects among citizens affects adaptive behavior.  Lastly, the 
introduction of time into the model provides an opportunity to witness changes to utility 
in citizens at some regular interval.  
How do the changes we introduce to the Brookings model affect emergent phenomenon?  
These changes are discussed at length in chapter 4 & 5 and are broadly grouped between 
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findings resulting from our exploration of a static model (non-time dependent) and 
dynamic simulations that explore changes to utility over time. In chapter 4, the central 
findings are: 
 Lower levels of average utility are correlated with higher magnitude protests, 
regardless of utility distribution; 
 Lower levels of utility are associated with greater frequency of protest, regardless 
of distribution; 
 Variance of utility  is associated with the earlier onset of protest; 
 In high average utility models, higher variance increases magnitude and 
frequency of protest; lower utility models with higher variance lowers magnitude 
and frequency of protest; and  
 Lower utility citizens are associated with higher instability. 
 
Of these results, the fourth finding is the most surprising. While we could surmise that 
lower levels of citizen utility are associated with higher grievance thus leading to bouts of 
aggression (e.g. the bread riot), the bifurcated result discussed in finding four offers a 
significantly different conceptualization of the relationship between  inequality and civil 
unrest.  
Traditionally, scholars have theorized that inequality is directly correlated with increased 
civil unrest. The line of reasoning being that as the masses have less relative  to the 
wealthy, angry protest ensue against the inequity of distribution of income. Yet despite 
well articulated arguments, and in some cases specific examples of a correlation, broad 
based econometric analysis has not been able to find any linkage between the two. The 
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model proposed in this paper, conceptually demonstrates a bifurcated result that is both 
utility and threshold dependent. At some point, increased equality of citizens in a system 
ceases to be stability maximizing and instead introduces extreme volatility in the system. 
For example if we have two societies, each with perfect equality amongst its populace, 
one that is wealthy and meets all of the needs of its populace, the other poor. In the first 
case, the entire populace has a home, food, and is able to live a meaningful life. In this 
society it is unlikely we see unrest due to financial hardship as individuals have what they 
need to survive. In the second case however, the entire society is below some threshold of 
subsistence. While all individuals are equal, they are all equally starving.   
In chapter 5, we expanded our work on the Brookings model to account for inter-
temporal changes. By adding time to our analysis, we induce adaptive changes by 
citizens in the system allowing us to examine how protest emerges or collapses in our 
model. This effort produced nine key findings that include: 
 Increasing average utility over time leads to quelling of revolt followed by periods 
of punctuated protest; 
 Increasing average utility over time associated with lower numbers of rebels in 
revolt; 
 Higher initial utility variance associated with lower number of rebels in revolt; 
 During revolt, increasing the utility variance affects the rate of change of active 
citizens in the system; 
 Higher utility variance associated with higher magnitude and frequency of 
punctuated protest in systems in system with increasing levels of average utility; 
 Higher utility distributions have punctuated protest that take longer to quell; 
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 Decreasing average utility over time leads to punctuated protest followed by the 
outbreak of revolt; 
 Decreasing average utility associated with higher magnitude and frequency of   
protest; and 
 Higher initial utility distribution leads to earlier punctuated protest; 
These results have provided useful concepts in understanding how the form of protest 
emerges in systems of decreasing utility, how its distribution affects frequency and 
magnitude, and finally how seemingly intractable revolt collapses into protest. The 
results presented are useful conceptual findings that draw on inference from individual 
behavior that provide coherent and plausible emergent phenomenon in social systems. 
Assuming that these results are supported by additional empirical work they provide 
useful guidance to researchers for future empirical work and provide insight for policy 
making in societies that might be at risk for civil conflict.      
Implications for Public Policy  
 
Understanding how protest emerges from individualized grievance and how it progresses 
to a coherent and large-scale movement in a society remains an important goal for policy 
makers eager to address issues that help to forestall significant social upheaval. The 
recent protests, revolts, and rebellions of the Arab Spring serve as an enduring reminder 
to the speed and magnitude of social unrest in seemingly stable countries. The findings in 
this study  demonstrate that the level of utility, its distribution, and rate of change can 
matter substantially. While we have focused on expanding a conceptual model of protest 
in a system of agents, the findings can provide useful insight into how protest forms, 
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evolves, and expands. Therefore understanding these dynamics is useful to policy makers 
who are concerned about state stability while in a period of economic transition and 
reform.   
While the speed and severity of Arab Spring protests served to highlight to much of the 
world the problem of civil conflict, significant research on the subject has been ongoing. 
The most recent work has explored socio-economic, geographic, and demographic 
variables deemed to be important determinants of civil conflict. Chief among these 
findings are that measures of income and economic growth are found to be strong 
correlates with outbreaks of civil war. Yet while some of these results have been accepted 
into the orthodoxy of civil conflict research (e.g. measures of income per capita), they 
tend to interpret the behavior of rebels as a form of rent seeking behavior or as an 
indicator of central state weakness not as a form of individual grievance as motivator to 
protest, revolt, and eventually rebellion. While this might be good at explaining quasi 
criminal conflicts in Sierra Leone or in the drug producing regions of Columbia, they are 
less successful in explaining the origins and evolution of political protest found in the 
Arab Spring, where individual action lead to protest, growing in size and intensity.  If 
individual condition remains an important factor in social stability, leaders in weak states 
should consider the impact policy changes have on its most vulnerable citizens.  
Implications for Subsidy Reform 
 
International organizations and central authorities expend a great deal of effort in 
understanding the complexities of underperforming economies, developing reasonable 
action plans, and finally managing the process of economic reform. The objective of both 
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organizations and their government partners is to boost national income. Often part of the 
strategy is to reform subsidy programs to help foster faster growth leading to increasing 
incomes for citizens. These reform efforts often call for removal of state support of 
common household staples such as cooking gas or bread. These reforms reduce 
government expenditures on price supports, that can then be used in areas that are more 
productive. In the end, the economy grows as the government allocates resources more 
efficiently. These efforts are well intentioned and serve to solve the larger structural 
problems in the economy, but they largely ignore possible short-run social stability 
concerns. The removal of state subsidies on highly demand inelastic goods such as 
cooking fuel, reduces household income as individuals are unable to substitute away from 
these goods. While wealthy or middle class households are unlikely to suffer significantly 
under this type of reform, low income households might find it more difficult to survive. 
If stretched enough, an individual or group might see no alternative but to voice their 
discontent.   
Increasing Individual Deprivation: Jordanian Subsidy Reform 
 
On February 4th 2011, an explosion destroyed a pipeline to Israel and Jordan, 
significantly disrupting fuel supplies to both countries. This was the latest in a series of 
attacks against pipelines since the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt forced Hosni Mubarak 
from power.
14
 This attack forced Jordan to import its energy by other means, significantly 
increasing the cost of energy in the Kingdom. The Jordanian government maintained 
state subsidies to help insulate the populace from increased prices, but at the cost of 






increasing central government expenditures on fuel subsides in 2011 and the first half of 
2012. Prime Minister Fayez al-Tarawneh estimated that the additional cost to the budget 
had reached roughly 2.5 billion Jordanian Dinars by mid 2012.
15
 
 Facing a yawning budget deficit and needing to reduce expenditures, the government 
announced on September 1
st
 2012 a modest 10% increase in fuel prices. The following 
day, Jordanians from Amman to the southern city of Ma'an rallied for the immediate 
resignation of Prime Minister Fayez al-Tarawneh in the face of increased prices.
16
 The 
protesters were reported to be numbered in the thousands.
17
 On September 3
rd
, the 
Jordanian King acquiescing to the demonstrators, announced a suspension to increased of 
fuel prices.  While the King’s announcement appeared for the moment to mollify the 
populace, political demonstrations returned on October 5th and reportedly attracted up to 
10,000 people calling on the government to take up needed economic reforms.
18
  After 
the October rally, street  demonstrations appeared to ebb with the government raising the 
prospects of new elections to meet many of the protesters demands.  
On November 13
th
 , 2012 the cabinet announced that subsidy reforms would be carried 
out resulting in a increase in gasoline, cooking and heating gas. The Jordanian 
government indicated that without support payments from foreign partners, specifically 
Saudi Arabia, they were unable to keep the supports in place
19
. The reform was 
reintroduced as the budget deficit from increased fuel payments swelled above 3 billion 















dinar. Gasoline prices for 90 Octane increased from JD 0.70 per liter to JD 0.80. Diesel 
fuel increased from JD 0.515 to JD 0.685 per liter, a 33% increase. Gas for cooking 
increased the most rising from JD 6.50 to JD 10.00, a 54% in the price for a single gas 
cylinder.
20
   
 
Figure 22: Protest Numbers in Jordan 2012 
 
Once again, violent protests erupted from November 13
th
 through the 15
th 
with thousands 
taking to the streets in over 100 different demonstrations demanding the cessation of the 
subsidy reform program.
21
   The government, previously willing to suspend the subsidy 
reform program, found itself unable to, primarily because of the increasing deficit being 
driven by the higher fuel costs. In a bid to soften the impact to poor households, the 
government introduced proposals to provide direct cash payments of up to JD 420 per 
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year for families whose income did not surpass JD 10,000.
22
  At the time of the writing , 
it is not clear if the protests centered around energy subsidy reform in Jordan will 
continue. However, what this particular example demonstrates is the sensitivity of 
subsidy reform on households and the possible protest it can trigger. Although this is a 
single case example, it nicely frames a core concept of this paper, the economic 
conditions of the individual help to drive the emergence of protest, its magnitude, and 
frequency. While each example of political protest, revolt, or rebellion is multi faceted 
the role of grievance stemming from individual deprivation should be considered as a 
significant determinant of political protest.  
Tying Subsidy Reform to the Growth Model  
  
The story of Jordanian subsidy is an interesting case study, but can it be tied to the model 
presented in this paper to help us understand how emergent protest forms? The growth 
model presented in Chapter 5 while purely conceptual does provide us a framework to 
understand how changes to subsidy programs in Jordan can influence social stability. In 
this section, I discuss the Jordanian subsidy case coupled with an extension to the 
conceptual model in Chapter 5. This extension simply allows for differing growth to 
utility among citizens in our model. To achieve variable growth, I simply allow the 
amount of utility added to citizens to vary by a standard deviation greater than zero. This 
allows us to examine average growth to citizens in the model, but varies the amount of 
growth each individual citizen experiences. Therefore, if the average growth of utility is 
.001 utiles per iteration of the model, but varies with a standard deviation of 0.005 we 






find that some citizens will add utility at a level greater than .001, while others 
experience negative utility growth. This action simulates inequality of growth in the 
model and is an important extension as we discuss how subsidy reform affects economic 
growth and social stability.    
In Figure 22 we show the reported protests in Jordan before and after the announcement 
of fuel subsidy reform. Prior to the announcement on September 1
st
 2012, there were no 
protests reported as noted by no spikes in the graph prior to that date
23
. We can compare 
that initial condition with our model output represented in Figure 23. We have a initial 
system that has a level of utility of 0.5 (blue line) that remains constant through the first 
500 iterations of the model. Beginning with iteration 501 we reduce the level of utility for 
all citizens by .01 for 10 periods.  
 
Figure 23: Reducing Utility and Subsequent Protest 
                                                     
23
 Earlier protests in 2011 were tied to general economic problems such as unemployment, but as this 
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 This serves to reduce utility by 0.1 to a new level 0.4. This is meant to simulate the 
reduction in citizen well-being stemming from the removal of subsides. In our Jordanian 
example, this would represent either the initial subsidy reform announcement on 
September 1
st
 2012, or the second announcement on November 13
th
 2012. We can see in 





 iteration with the largest protest reaching around 120 active citizens.  Do we 
see the same phenomenon in our real world example? If we again look at Figure 22, we 
see after the announcement on September 1
st
 and again on November 13
th
 large protests 
erupting in Jordan. While not an exhaustive analysis on the efficacy of the model, this 
simple example allows us to draw a linkage between real world events and our model 
presented in this paper.  
The subsidy reform effort in Jordan was primarily aimed at reducing financial support to 
better off households who were receiving benefits at the expense of the central 
government.
24
 By reducing inefficient subsidy support, along with other reform measures 
the International Monetary Fund seeks increase economic growth in the country and to 
improve its overall fiscal position.
25
 However, if subsidy support is removed for all 
households in an attempt to generate long-term economic gains is there a risk for both 
short-term social instability even as the country is growing?  








Figure 24: Subsidy Reform, Growth, and Protest 
In Figure 24, we again revisit a model that shows a system that has a starting utility of 
0.5, but introduces subsidy reform at iteration 500. The subsidy reform reduces average 
utility to 0.4 generating punctuated protest, something we predict from our discussion 
thus far. At iteration 1000 we introduce economic growth by adding utility to every 
citizen. Protest evaporates from the system leading us to conclude that although short-
term instability is a real problem with subsidy reform, in the long-run stability returns 
with all agents becoming better off. Does this proposition hold when growth is uneven?  
In the discussion above we stepped through how the model can help us understand protest 
dynamics associated with subsidy reform, however our analysis was limited to equal 
growth shared by all citizens. If we allow growth among citizens to vary do we get the 
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Figure 25: Subsidy Reform, Growth, and Protest 
 Figure 25 is similar to Figure 24 in that the system begins with the same initial utility 
and is subject to subsidy reform at iteration 500, lowering average utility in the system by 
0.1. However, while Figure 24 introduced economic growth for all citizens at iteration 
1000, Figure 25 allows growth to vary among citizens. By introducing variable growth 
we see a different result. Even through average utility increases overall for the system, 
social stability erodes. If this model is to be believed, then while reform efforts might be 
successful in increasing overall growth in a country, an unintended consequence might by 
increased social instability for a longer period. This is an important issue for policy 
makers and researchers as it highlights a deeper and more complex set of interactions 
among citizens and the state. While I do not formally address this model variant in this 
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as an example of the usefulness of the ABM approach to understanding changes in 
economic reform policy.  
Areas for Future Research 
 
This paper discussed changes to a portion of the Brookings Model as a way to explore 
how changes in individual utility affect the emergence of protest in a system of citizens. 
The goal of this effort was to understand how these changes would affect the emergent 
behavior of citizens in the system. While changes to both the average level of utility and 
its distribution produced important conceptual breakthroughs for our understanding of 
how utility and protest relate, there remains additional work that would help expand on 
our results. These efforts include a renewed examination of large-scale statistical 
evidence utilizing the results of this paper as a series of testable hypotheses, additional 
work with specific case studies and micro level data on protest, and finally additional 
conceptual work that builds upon the simple changes made to the Brookings model.   
Our results, while informative conceptually, need to be verified empirically either 
through case study or statistically. While some empirical research has supported the 
general viability of the Brookings Model, additional empirical work would help in 
supporting our conclusions about the relationship between individual economic condition 
and the emergence of civil unrest (Gulden 2004, Epstein 2010). To test the viability of 
the findings in this paper statistically, an effort that examines individual well-being (egg 
not only income) and civil unrest should be pursued. While beyond the scope of this 
paper, examining the role of poverty as a derivative of utility distribution would be 
helpful in supporting or refuting many of the results of this paper that identify low utility 
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citizens as a measurable determinant for the onset, magnitude, and frequency of protest. 
To achieve this, our measures of poverty cannot simply be income based, but must 
include the range of state supported services (e.g. state subsidy) that contribute to overall 
well-being. While some efforts to examine this relationship have shown some support to 
this conclusion, more research is needed to establish this link (Vadlamannati 2011).  
While econometric research utilizing large datasets has been useful in identifying 
apparent causal links, they are unable to reach consensus about the role that grievance 
factors play in civil unrest (Sambanis 2004).  The large  datasets used by researchers 
aggregate measures of political systems, economic, and social condition and therefore 
cannot provide the localized data required to understand civil unrest at a sub national 
level. Localized conditions have been shown to produce strikingly different conclusions 
from common casual explanations of civil violence that rely on macroeconomic data 
(Jones 2007).  The results in this paper are characterized by changes to the onset time, 
magnitude and frequency of punctuated protest that lend itself to localized data analysis 
to support its results.  In fact the recent spate of protest in several countries during the 
Arab spring are characterized by growing punctuated protest, with some evolving into 
civil war (e.g Libya and Syria) while others exhibiting on-going peaceful protest (e.g 
Jordan). Each case while part of the collective phenomenon of the Arab Spring remain 
distinct in the formation and evolution of protest, therefore requiring individual treatment 
by researchers.  
While this paper has advanced our understanding of the dynamics of political protest, it 
does not portend to have constructed a final version of such a model. While the effort of 
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this research has extended the Brookings Model, it has not attempted to incorporate some 
additional elements we might deem important. Some of these might include: 
 As utility changes over time, do citizens change their perceived legitimacy 
of the central authority? If so how does it affect punctuated protest? 
 As protest levels increase, how are changes in central regime response 
modeled? 
 If protesters are killed vice imprisoned, is there a substantial change in our 
results?  
 How do changes to period weights affect the sensitivity of utility changes 
over time? 
Future efforts to expand on this work are likely to identify additional elements that are 
also relevant in our analysis of how economic conditions, government legitimacy, and 
security affect emergent mass protest.  
Conclusion 
 
Through the course of this paper, we have explored a conceptual approach to 
understanding the emergence and evolution of political protest. By using an agent based 
model approach and extending earlier work we find that the level, distribution, and rate of 
change of utility affects the onset, frequency, and magnitude of political protest in a 
system of agents. This approach is markedly different from analysis that has utilized case 
study or statistical models to draw correlations between variables and the onset of civil 
war. While these studies have been useful for identifying some determinants of increased 
probability of civil violence, they are limited in their function. Our agent based modeling 
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approach allows us to explore multiple iterations providing a conceptual framework that 
yields consistent and coherent results that should and could become the starting point for 
additional empirical analysis.  
The protests, revolts, and revolutions of the Arab spring serve as a reminder of the 
importance of understanding the underlying causes of social instability. Seemingly 
isolated acts of desperation can have profound geo-political consequences. With the 
speed and breadth of modern telecommunications ideas and social upheaval can move 
faster and further than ever before. This requires a deep understanding of the 
determinants and evolution of conflict so that reasonable policies can be put in place to 
address grievance before social instability manifests itself and moves beyond our control. 
By addressing the underlying concerns of people yearning for a better life, we help 





Appendix I: NETLOGO Code for the Modified Rebellion 
 
;; Core rebellion codeset wriiten by Uri Wilensky. Modified by Charles Harry to include 
modified measures of starting mean utility, and standard deviation. Also modifies to 
allow for the ability to change utility over time. 
  
 breed [agents agent] 
 breed [cops cop] 
  
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;Defining Varibles;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  
 globals 
 [ 
   k                 ;;factor for determining arrest probablity 
   
    
   ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;Slider Variables;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  
   ;; Threshold is by how much must G > N to make someone rebel? 
   ;; Copy Density is how many copy is the field you want to deploy 
   ;; Agent Density is how many agents you want in the field  
   ;; movement? is a true or false variable that allows for movement 
   ;; income-variability is a variable to add to Utility in present period to account for 
changes in income. 
  ] 
  




   risk-aversion      ;; R, fixed for the citizen’s lifetime, ranging from 0-1 (inclusive) 
   perceived-hardship ;; H, a function of utility   H(utilityn) 
   utilityn           ;; Utility in period N 
   utilityn-1         ;; Utility in period n-1   
   utilityn-2         ;; Utility in period n-2 
   utilityn-3         ;; Utility in period n-3 
   utilityn-4         ;; Utility in period n-4 
   utilityn-5         ;; Utility in period n-5 
   active?            ;; if true, then the agent is actively rebelling 
   jailterm           ;; how many turns in jail remain (if 0, the agent is not in jail) 
   personallegitimacy ;; agents personal legitimacy 
   shadowutilityn     ;; Utility without stimulus intervention 
   shadowutilityn-1   ;; Utility without stimulus intervention period n-1 
   maxutility         ;; Maximum Utility level 
    
          
 ] 
  
 patches-own   ;; defining variable for patches 
 [ 
   neighborhood       ;; surrounding patches within the vision radius 
   ;vision             ;; value of vision 
 ] 
   
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;Begining Setup Procedure;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  
 to setup 
   ca                 ;; clear the model 
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   set k 2.3          ;; set arrest probablity to 2.3 
      
   ask patches 
   [ 
     set pcolor gray - 1   ;; sets the patches background color to dark gray 
     set neighborhood patches in-radius vision   ;; cache patch neighborhood 
   ] 
    
   create-cops round (initial-cop-density * .01 * count patches)  ;; Creating cops 
   [ 
      
     move-to one-of patches with   ;;move a cop to a random patch "where the following 
exists..."  
     [ 
       not any? turtles-here       ;;no citizens exist in this patch  
     ] 
     
     display 
   ] 
     
   create-agents round (initial-agent-density * .01 * count patches)   ;;creating agent  
    
   [ 
     move-to one-of patches with  ;; move a agent to a random patch "where the following 
exists..." 
     [ 
       not any? turtles-here      ;; no citizens exist in this patch 
132 
 
     ] 
     
    set heading 0                                           ;; heading of the turtle 
    set risk-aversion random-float 1.0          ;; sets a random number for the citizens risk 
adversion 
    set perceived-hardship random-normal mean-strt-income stddev-strt-income  ;; sets a 
random number for percieved hardship 
    set utilityn perceived-hardship                                           ;; sets hardship and utilityn as 
the same 
    set utilityn-1 utilityn                                                   ;; sets the previous periods utility 
to the same 
    set utilityn-2 utilityn                                                   ;; sets the previous periods utility 
to the same 
    set utilityn-3 utilityn                                                   ;; sets the previous periods utility 
to the same 
    set utilityn-4 utilityn                                                   ;; sets the previous periods utility 
to the same 
    set utilityn-5 utilityn                                                   ;; sets the previous periods utility 
to the same    
    set active? false                                                         ;; sets the flag for active to false  
    set jailterm 0                                                            ;; sets inital state of jailterm to 0 
    set color blue                                                            ;; sets color of agent blue  
    set personallegitimacy government-legitimacy                              ;; sets individual 
legitimacy based on change to income 
    display 
   ]  
     
   ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;Calculating the Starting Hoover Index for 
Inequality;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
   ask agents 
   [ 
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     let utilitymax max [utilityn] of agents                                  ;; Set Max Utility 
     let utilitymin min [utilityn] of agents                                  ;; Set Min Utility 
     let utilitydiff utilitymax - utilitymin                                  ;; Defining the Utility 
Difference 
     let quintilesize utilitydiff / 5                                         ;; Calculating the Quintile Size 
     let quintile-1 utilitymin + quintilesize                                 ;; Calculating the upper 
bound of Quint 1 
     let quintile-2 quintile-1 + quintilesize                                 ;; Calculating the upper 
bound of Quint 2 
     let quintile-3 quintile-2 + quintilesize                                 ;; Calculating the upper 
bound of Quint 3 
     let quintile-4 quintile-3 + quintilesize                                 ;; Calculating the upper 
bound of Quint 4 
     let quintile-5 quintile-4 + quintilesize                                 ;; Calculating the upper 
bound of Quint 5 
     let utilitysum sum [utilityn] of agents                                  ;; Sum total Utility for the 
system 
     let agentcount count agents  
     
     if utilityn >= utilitymin and utilityn <= quintile-1                      ;; Calculating the Sum 
and count for the quintile 1 
     [ 
           
     set utilitysumquint1 sum [utilityn] of agents 
     set countquint1 count agents  
      
     ] 
      
     if utilityn > quintile-1 and utilityn <= quintile-2                       ;; Calculating the Sum 
and count for the quintile 2 
     [ 
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       set utilitysumquint2 sum [utilityn] of agents 
       set countquint2 count agents 
     ] 
      
     if utilityn > quintile-2 and utilityn <= quintile-3                       ;; Calculating the Sum 
and count for the quintile 3 
     [ 
       set utilitysumquint3 sum [utilityn] of agents 
       set countquint3 count agents 
     ] 
      
     if utilityn > quintile-3 and utilityn <= quintile-4                       ;; Calculating the Sum 
and count for the quintile 4 
     [ 
       set utilitysumquint4 sum [utilityn] of agents 
       set countquint4 count agents 
     ] 
      
     if utilityn > quintile-4 and utilityn <= quintile-5                       ;; Calculating the Sum 
and count for the quintile 5 
     [ 
       set utilitysumquint5 sum [utilityn] of agents 
       set countquint5 count agents 
     ] 
              
   set hooverindex ( 0.5 * ( abs ( ( utilitysumquint1 / utilitysum ) - ( countquint1 / 
agentcount )) + abs ( ( utilitysumquint2 / utilitysum ) - ( countquint2 / agentcount )) + abs 
( ( utilitysumquint3 / utilitysum ) - ( countquint3 / agentcount )) + abs (( utilitysumquint4 
/ utilitysum ) - ( countquint4 / agentcount )) + abs ( ( utilitysumquint5 / utilitysum ) - ( 
countquint5 / agentcount ))) ) 
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   ]   
 
  ;; update plots                              ;; plot inital state of the system 
   end 
  
  
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Start of the Go Procedure ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  
  
 to go 
   ask turtles                                              ; All Turtle Specific Commands 
   [ 
     if (breed = agents and jailterm = 0) or breed = cops   ; If it is a agent not in jail or a 
cop 
         [  
           Move                                             ; Move Procedure -- Rule M 
         ] 
     if breed = agents and jailterm = 0                     ; Rule A: Determine if each agent sould 
be active or quiet 
         [ 
           determine-behavior 
         ] 
     if breed = cops                                        ; Rule C: Cops arrest a random active agent 
within their radius  
         [  
           enforce 
         ]  




    
   ask agents                                               ; Only Agent Breed Commands 
   [ 
     if jailterm > 0                                        ; If Jailterm is greater than 0 then 
     [  
       set jailterm jailterm - 1                            ; Reduce Jailterm by 1 
     ]  
   ]   
    
   ask agents 
   [  
     display-agent                                          ; Updates the agent disply 
     
   ] 
   ask cops 
   [ 
     display-cop                                            ; Updates the cop display 
   ] 
    
   tick                                                     ; Advance the clock 
   update-plots                                             ; Update all Plots  
   
    
   
   










;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  Start of Move Procedure;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;    
to move 
  if movement? or (breed = cops)                   ; If movement? is on or the breed is a cop   
   
  [ 
  let targets neighborhood with                    ; set local variable "targets" to neighborhood 
where 
            [ 
              not any? cops-here and all? agents-here     ; there are no cops and there are 
agents with all agents here have a jailterm > 0 
                 [ jailterm > 0] 
            ] 
   if any? targets                                 ; If any targets move to one of the targets 
             [ 
               move-to one-of targets 
             ] 
 if breed = agents 
  
 [  
    
   if shock = true  and ticks  >= start-of-shock and ticks <= end-of-shock 
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   [ 
   
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
   ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Sets the following conditions if ticks are in the range of 
a crisis;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
   
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
   set utilityn-5 utilityn-4                                                                                    ; Sets Utility 
in N-5 as Utility in N-4 
   set utilityn-4 utilityn-3                                                                                    ; Sets Utility 
in N-4 as Utility in N-3 
   set utilityn-3 utilityn-2                                                                                    ; Sets Utility 
in N-3 as Utility in N-2 
   set utilityn-2 utilityn-1                                                                                    ; Sets Utility 
in N-2 as Utility in N-1 
   set utilityn-1 utilityn                                                                                      ; Sets Utility 
in N-1 as Utility in N 
   set utilityn utilityn  + random-normal mean-income stddev-income - Period-Utility-
Loss-During-Shock          ; Shocks the agent with a loss of utility based on the user 
defined variable 
    
   if utilityn > 1                                 ; If Utilityn is larger than 1  
    
   [ 
     set utilityn 1                                ; sets Utilityn as 1 (Bounds Utility to 1) 
   ] 
   if utilityn < 0                                 ; If Utilityn is less than 0 
   [ 
     set utilityn 0                                ; sets utiltyn to 0  (Bounds Utility to zero) 
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   ]    
    
   ] 
      
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
   ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  Sets the following conditions if the ticks are NOT in the 
range of a crisis;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
   
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
   
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
    
   set utilityn-5 utilityn-4                                                        ; Sets Utility in N-5 as Utility 
in N-4 
    
   set utilityn-4 utilityn-3                                                        ; Sets Utility in N-4 as Utility 
in N-3 
    
   set utilityn-3 utilityn-2                                                        ; Sets Utility in N-3 as Utility 
in N-2 
                                                           
   set utilityn-2 utilityn-1                                                        ; Sets Utility in N-2 as Utility 
in N-1 
    
   set utilityn-1 utilityn                                                          ; Sets Utility in N-1 as Utility 
in N 
    
   set utilityn utilityn + random-normal mean-income stddev-income                  ; Sets 





;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Determines if it is the period before the start of stimulus 
and then sets the shadow utility variable;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;    
   if ticks = start-of-stimulus - 1 
   [ 
     set shadowutilityn utilityn 
   ]   
   
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Determines if and when the stimulus should begin 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;   
   if stimulus = true and ticks >= start-of-stimulus and ticks <= end-of-stimulus and 
income-limit <= .25 
 [ 
    
   set utilityn utilityn + Stimulus-gain 
       
 ] 
  
 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;Determines end of stimulus period and then removes all 
of stimulus provided;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 if stimulus = true and ticks = end-of-stimulus 
 [ 
   set utilityn shadowutilityn 
 ] 
    
   if utilityn > 1                                 ; If Utilityn is larger than 1  
   [ 
     set utilityn 1                                ; sets Utilityn as 1 (Bounds Utility to 1) 
   ] 
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   if utilityn < 0                                 ; If Utilityn is less than 0 
   [ 
     set utilityn 0                                ; sets utiltyn to 0  (Bounds Utility to zero) 
   ]    
  
   ] 
   ]  
 
  








;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Start of the Determine-Behavior Procedure;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to determine-behavior 
set active? (grievance - risk-aversion * estimated-arrest-probability > threshold) ; Uses 









  report ( 1 - (U-Period-N * utilityn + U-Period-N-1 * utilityn-1 + U-Period-N-2 * 
utilityn-2 + U-Period-N-3 * utilityn-3 + U-Period-N-4 * utilityn-4 + U-Period-N-5 * 
utilityn-5  ) ) * ( 1 - government-legitimacy )   ; Determines the Grievence value used in 
the rebellion determiniation 
end 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;Set estimated-arrest-probability Reporter;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to-report estimated-arrest-probability 
let C count cops-on neighborhood                              ; Counts the number of cops in a 
neighborhood 
  let A 1 + count (agents-on neighborhood) with [active?]     ; 









;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Start of the Enforce Procedure;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to enforce 
  if any? (agents-on neighborhood) with [active?]             ; If any agents on a 
neighboorhood are active  
  
   [ 
    ;; arrest suspect 
    let suspect one-of (agents-on neighborhood) with [active?] ; set local variable suspect 
as one of the active agents in the neighborhooh 
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    ask suspect [ 
      set active? false                                        ; set active? variable back to false 
      set jailterm random max-jailterm                         ; set jailterm as a random variable 
upto the maximum jailterm specified 
    ] 
    move-to suspect  ;; move to patch of the jailed agent      ; moves a cop to the patch of 
the jailed agent 




;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Start the Display-Agent Procedure;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to display-agent 
  ifelse visualization = "2D"               ; Reads the chooser button 
    [ display-agent-2D ]                    ; If the dropdown is listed as 2D it runs this procedure 
    [ display-agent-3D ]                    ; If it is false it runs the 3D procedure 
     
end 
 
to display-agent-2D  ;; agent procedure 
  set shape "circle" 
  ifelse active? 
    [ set color red ] 
    [ ifelse jailterm > 0 
        [ set color black + 3 ] 





to display-agent-3D  ;; agent procedure 
   
  set color scale-color green grievance 1.5 -0.5 
  ifelse active? 
    [ set shape "person active" ] 
    [ ifelse jailterm > 0 
        [ set shape "person jailed" ] 
        [ set shape "person quiet" ]  
    ]     
     
  end 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Start the Display-cop Procedure;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to display-cop 
    set color cyan 
  ifelse visualization = "2D" 
    [ set shape "triangle" ] 








  let active-count count agents with [active?] 
  let jailed-count count agents with [jailterm > 0] 
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  let average-utility mean [utilityn] of agents 
  let average-general-discontent mean [grievance - risk-aversion * estimated-arrest-
probability] of agents 
  let count-of-about-to-rebel count agents with [grievance - risk-aversion * estimated-
arrest-probability > .1] 
  let count-of-low-income-agents count agents with [utilityn < .25] 
  let inequality sum [ ( 1 / initial-agent-density ) * (utilityn - average-utility) ] of agents 
  let count-of-low-mid-income-agents count agents with [utilityn >= .25 and utilityn < .5] 
  let count-of-mid-high-income-agents count agents with [utilityn >= .5 and utilityn < .75] 
  let count-of-high-income-agents count agents with [utilityn > .75]   
   
 
  file-open "output.txt"                                   ; Write to output file  
 
   file-write average-utility file-write average-general-discontent file-write count-of-low-
income-agents file-write count-of-low-mid-income-agents file-write count-of-mid-high-
income-agents file-write count-of-high-income-agents file-write count-of-about-to-rebel 
file-write active-count file-print " "   
   file-close   
 
 
  set-current-plot "Active agents" 
  plot active-count 
 
  set-current-plot "All agent types" 
  set-current-plot-pen "active" 
  plot active-count 
  set-current-plot-pen "jailed" 
  plot jailed-count 
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  set-current-plot-pen "quiet" 
  plot count agents - active-count - jailed-count 
   
  set-current-plot "Average Utility and Discontent" 
  set-current-plot-pen "Utility" 
  plot average-utility 
  set-current-plot-pen "Discontent" 
  plot average-general-discontent  
   
  set-current-plot "Agent Sentiment" 
  set-current-plot-pen "Rebelling" 
  plot active-count 
  set-current-plot-pen "About to Rebel" 
  plot count-of-about-to-rebel 
  set-current-plot-pen "Low Income Agents" 
  plot count-of-low-income-agents 
   






Appendix II: Average Number of Active Citizens 
 
Average Number of Citizens During Protest 
    Standard Deviation 
  
 









0.9 0 0 0 0 0 
0.8 0 0 0 0 0 
0.7 0 0 0 0 0 
0.6 0 0 0 0 0 
0.5 0 0 0 1 1 
0.4 0 2 2 4 14 
0.35 1 30 56 51 43 
0.3 383 195 115 77 95 
0.2 382 382 318 232 169 












Appendix III: Peak Number of Citizens During Protest 
Peak Number of Citizens During Protest 
    Standard Deviation 
  
 









0.9 0 0 0 0 0 
0.8 0 0 0 0 0 
0.7 0 0 0 1 1 
0.6 0 0 0 1 2 
0.5 0 0 1 5 17 
0.4 0 4 21 60 169 
0.35 1 182 248 247 247 
0.3 668 472 382 345 347 
0.2 644 646 594 487 434 














Appendix IV: Period of Time with Protest 
Period of Time with Protest 
    Standard Deviation 
  
 









0.9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
0.8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
0.7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
0.6 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 
0.5 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 5.7% 10.8% 
0.4 0.0% 0.5% 6.8% 13.9% 33.6% 
0.35 0.3% 14.6% 35.6% 30.5% 34.6% 
0.3 100.0% 98.5% 57.4% 44.9% 63.9% 
0.2 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 










Appendix V: Number of Low Income Agents 
Number of Low Income Agents (<.25) 
    Standard Deviation 
  
 









0.9 0 0 0 0 1 
0.8 0 0 0 0 2 
0.7 0 0 0 4 7 
0.6 0 0 0 6 32 
0.5 0 0 2 31 57 
0.4 0 1 54 107 182 
0.35 0 19 109 200 222 
0.3 0 125 236 285 310 
0.2 762 639 543 506 453 






Appendix VI:  Number of Low-Mid Income Agents 
Number of Low-Mid Income Agents (0.25-0.5) 
    Standard Deviation 
  
 









0.9 0 0 0 2 19 
0.8 0 0 1 25 49 
0.7 0 1 25 84 136 
0.6 0 42 142 213 239 
0.5 638 445 417 361 344 
0.4 762 748 615 483 370 
0.35 762 741 600 456 380 
0.3 762 637 508 422 336 
0.2 0 123 217 246 259 





Appendix VII: Number of Mid-High Income Agents 
Number of Mid-High Income Agents (0.5-0.75) 
    Standard Deviation 
  
 









0.9 0 6 70 126 160 
0.8 0 160 255 281 282 
0.7 0 684 523 430 298 
0.6 762 720 579 444 329 
0.5 124 317 341 346 292 
0.4 0 13 93 166 184 
0.35 0 2 53 104 140 
0.3 0 0 18 54 106 
0.2 0 0 2 10 49 





Appendix VIII: Number of High Income Agents 
Number of High Income Agents (>0.75) 
    Standard Deviation 
  
 









0.9 762 756 692 634 582 
0.8 762 602 506 456 429 
0.7 0 77 214 245 321 
0.6 0 0 41 101 162 
0.5 0 0 2 24 69 
0.4 0 0 0 6 26 
0.35 0 0 0 2 20 
0.3 0 0 0 1 10 
0.2 0 0 0 0 1 
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix VIV: Average Protest by Utility and Variance 
  























































































Number of Citizens by Utility Category 
Mean Utility 0.3 Std Dev 0.10 
Number of Low Income 
Agents 
Number of Low-Mid 
Income Agents 
Number of Mid-High 
Income Agents 
Number of High Income 
Agents 























Number of Citizens by Utility Category 
Mean Utility 0.3 Std Dev 0.20 
Number of Low Income 
Agents 
Number of Low-Mid 
Income Agents 
Number of Mid-High 
Income Agents 
Number of High Income 
Agents 
0-.24 .25-.49 .50-.74 .75-1 
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Number of Citizens by Utility Category 
Mean Utility 0.2 Std Dev 0.10 
Number of Low Income 
Agents 
Number of Low-Mid 
Income Agents 
Number of Mid-High 
Income Agents 
Number of High Income 
Agents 























Number of Citizens by Utility Category 
Mean Utility 0.2 Std Dev 0.20 
Number of Low Income 
Agents 
Number of Low-Mid 
Income Agents 
Number of Mid-High 
Income Agents 
Number of High Income 
Agents 
0-.24 .25-.49 .50-.74 .75-1 
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Declining Utility and Protest 











































































Declining Utility and Protest 







































































Declining Utility and Protest   
 








































































Declining Utility and Protest  
 













































































Declining Utility and Protest 
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